A North American P-51B Mustang with wing gloves for research into low-drag performance in flight at Langley. Photograph courtesy NASA.
Panzerwrecks 14: Ostfront 2 is scheduled for release in December 2012.
Feature sections include “Odd StuGs: Ostfront Edition”, “Tehumardi Wrecks”, “Wrecks of Operation Bagration”, and “Panzer Wrecks in the Woods”. Oddities and rare vehicles pictured include Sturmgeschütz III and IV uparmoured with concrete and more; Bergepanzer III armed with a 2cm Kw.K; Lines of wrecked Panthers at Narva; Pz.Sp.Wg. 204(f) outfitted as a ‘Draisine’; Six photos of the rare 7.5cm Pak 97/38(f) auf Pz.Kpfw.740(r); Hungarian armour: Turán I and II, Nimród; Final production Pz.Kpfw.IV; Wrecked Bulgarian Pz.Kpfw.IVs in Hungary; and Panther Ausf.G infra-red ready.
Long list of vehicle include: Tiger I, Tiger II, Panther Ausf.D, Panther Ausf.A, Panther Ausf.G, Panther Ausf.G – I/R ready, Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.G, Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.H, Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.J, Sturmgeschütz IV, Panzer IV/70(V), Jagdpanzer IV, Hummel, Nashorn, Flakpanzer Möbelwagen, Sturmgeschütz III Ausf.G, Sturmgeschütz III Ausf.C/D, Sturmhaubitze 42, Pz.Beob.Wg.III, Bergepanzer III – 2cm KwK, Pz.Kpfw.II Ausf.J, Wespe, Pz.Jgr.II für 7.5cm Pak 40, T 34/76, 7.5cm Pak 97/98 auf Pz.Kpfw.740(r), Pz.Kpfw. M3 (a) Stuart, BT42 (Finnish), Nimrod (Hungarian), Turan I (Hungarian), Turan II (Hungarian), Sd.Kfz.251 Ausf.D, Sd.Kfz.251/3, Sd.Kfz.251/9, Sd.Kfz.251/16, Sd.Kfz.251/17, Sd.Kfz.250 Ausf.A, Sd.Kfz.250 Ausf.B, Sd.Kfz.10/4, RSO/01, 15cm Panzerwerfer 42 Pz.Sp.Wg.AB41 201(i), and Pz.Sp.Wg.P 204(f).
More information can be found at: www.panzerwrecks.com.
Me 109 Drop Tanks (Betriebsstoff-Zusatzanlage) photographs and diagrams from Bf 109 G-4 Flugzeug-Handbuch:
The following opinions are from German General Leutnant Linnarz, commander of the German 26th Panzer Division in Italy, concerning Allied airpower and its effects on German forces. Source: Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Office of the assistant chief of air staff–2, Washington, D.C., January 1946. Defeat was prepared by the Headquarters Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Intelligence Section to record the views of Allied air power from those who were on the receiving end.
OPINIONS OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LINNARZ
Commanding General of 26th Panzer Division in Italy
26 JUNE 1945.
The following report is the result of several conversations with General Leutnant Linnarz who was the Commanding General of the crack German 26 Panzer Division in Italy.
The Role of Air Power
“Single battles, in my opinion, are not decisive; they are only apparently decisive. The same thing is true of air battles. The complete havoc wrought by Allied air power toward the end of the war when we no longer had an air arm worthy of the name, may give an entirely false impression of the role of air power in deciding the victory. Such overwhelming air supremacy is not so much the cause of Germany’s defeat, but the result and visible evidence of Germany’s defeat. The war was actually decided long ago, and if the German government had given up earlier, before air power had devastated the German cities, and before the Eastern and Western land armies had joined, the results of great decisive air and land battles preceding Germany’s military collapse would not have been known. The great destructive capacity of giant air armadas would not have been realized.
“In the same category as the overwhelming Allied air and ground offensive toward the end of this war are the battles of Vittorio, Venato and the rapid Allied advances in the Balkans at the end of the last war. There are no more battles in the old classic sense. In France we styled our reports in the old manner. The result of the impression was thus one of gigantic land battles and clever generalship, a totally false impression. In my opinion, the Allies are in danger of making the same erroneous interpretations of air victories.
Continue reading 26th Panzer Division
Instructions for painting the M4 Sherman tank from the Technical Manual TM 9-731B: Medium Tank M4A2, January 1943.
Section XXV: PAINTING
a. Ordnance materiel is painted before issue to the using arms. One maintenance coat per year will ordinarily be ample for protection. With but few exceptions, this materiel will be painted with ENAMEL, synthetic, olive drab, lusterless. The enamel may be applied over old coats of long oil enamel and oil paint previously issued by the Ordnance Department if the old coat is in satisfactory condition for repainting.
b. Paints and enamels, usually issued ready for use, are applied by brush or spray. They may be brushed on satisfactorily when used unthinned in the original package consistency or when thinned no more than 5 per cent by volume with THINNER. The enamel will spray satisfactorily when thinned with 15 per cent by volume of THINNER. (Linseed oil must not be used as a thinner in this enamel, since it will impart an undesirable luster.) If sprayed, enamel dries rapidly enough to permit repainting after one-half hour, and dries hard in 16 hours.
c. Certain exceptions to the regulations concerning painting exist. Fire-control instruments, sighting equipment, and other associated items will not be painted.
d. Complete information on painting is contained in TM 9-850.
Continue reading Painting the M4 Tank
Organization of the WWII German Luftwaffe from the U.S. War Department’s Handbook for Combat Air Intelligence Officers, Army Air Forces Air Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, March 1944.
(1) The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) is one of three branches of the German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) and is organized and administered independently of the Army and the Navy.
(2) The Luftwaffe itself is divided into three parts: air, air signal, and antiaircraft artillery. Included in the Luftwaffe are parachute and airborne troops, air engineers, air medical corps, air police, and certain special air divisions used as regular fighting troops.
(3) Organized on a territorial rather than a functional basis and with operational and administrative commands separated, the GAF achieved a mobility and flexibility which was largely responsible for its initial success. (Organization of the GAF is shown on Chart B.)
Continue reading Organization of the Luftwaffe
Organization of the WWII Japanese Army Air Service and Naval Air Service from the U.S. War Department’s Handbook for Combat Air Intelligence Officers, Army Air Forces Air Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, March 1944.
(1) Owing to the excellence of Japanese counterintelligence during the years in which they were building their air strength, and owing to the difficulty of the Japanese language, Allied information about the organization of the Japanese Air Services is scanty and possibly inaccurate. (Charts C and D give the latest information available about the organization of both the Army and Naval Air Services.)
Continue reading Organization of the Japanese Air Force
From Japanese Electronics, OPNAV-16-VP101, Photographic Intelligence Report 1, Air Intelligence Group, Division of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, January 1945:
German Radar Summary
Examples of German Radar are included here to cover the possibility that the Japanese may have access to German equipment and technicians.
The Germans employ several types of land based installations covering the functions of Air Search, Fire Control, and Coast Watching.
These types are quite well standardized and are much more efficient than those the Japanese are known to have.
There is now some photographic evidence of German Radar equipment in use by the Japanese. Also, it is knowrn that many other types of German electronics equipment are being used.
The following table represents the latest list of German Radar types with salient information concerning each.
GERMAN LAND BASED RADAR
* – Width (Horizontal Dimension) Given First
|Name||Size of Screen*||Top of Screen Above Ground||Frequency||Range in Nautical Miles||Use|
|LIMBER FREYA||20′x 16′|
IFF – 16¼ x 3½’
30′ with IFF
|POLE FREYA ||20′x 16′|
IFF – 16¼ x 3½’ or 20′ x 8′
|32′, 35′ or 40′ with IFF||116-146 MCS.||100||A.S.|
|GIRDER CHIMNEY||19½’ x 97½||115′||120-130 MCS.||110||A.S.|
|CYLINDRICAL CHIMNEY||60′ x 97½|
IFF .22′ High
|GEMA COASTWATCHER||20′ x 8′||25′||370-390 MCS.||Depends on elevation (ASL) of site||C.W.|
|LARGE COASTWATCHER||35′ x 34′||40′||70-90 MCS.||60-75||C.W.|
|SMALL HOARDING||63¾’ x 44¾’||50′|| || ||C.W.|
|LARGE HOARDING||98′ x 36½’||50′||120-130 MCS.||100-115||C.W.|
|SMALL WURZBURG||10′ Diameter||12½’ in Vertical Position||550-580 MCS.||25||F.C.|
|GIANT WURZBURG||24′ Diameter||27′ in Vertical Position||470-580 MCS.||40||G.C.I., A.S. & C.W.|
A.S. – Air Search
F.C. – A/A Fire Control
C.W. – Coast Watching
G.C.I. – Ground Control Intercept
Drawings of all of the basic German Radar types are included on this page. Best known popular names are used for the designation of each type. It will be noted that these designs are quite well standardized for each particular use, and identification is easier because of this fact.
In most cases, this German equipment is superior to that now in use by the Japanese. A constant watch for German type designs of Radar in Japanese held territory is therefore in order.
The U.S. intelligence articles from Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 34, September 1943 have been added to the main Lone Sentry website:
The following correspondent’s report from the UP (United Press) describes the fighting at Hunt’s Gap in Tunisia in February-March 1943. Compare this account of the battle to the German commander Oberst. Rudolf Lang’s account and British observer Howard Marshall’s account.
BRITISH BOMBER SCORES AGAINST 6 GERMAN TANKS
Northern Tunisia Fighters Receiving Allied Air Support
BY EDWARD W. BEATTIE
ON THE NORTHERN TUNISIAN FRONT, March 1.—(UP)—There were six enemy tanks—big boys, probably Mark VI’s—massed north of the Mateur-Beja road when a bomber went in and dropped two bombs squarely into the middle of them.
British soldiers threw their helmets into the air and cheered. And well they might, for troops in this area never before had such air support as they are now receiving.
The British bombers caught Rommel’s supply columns in a narrow valley above. Beja Sunday. There was a thick fog lying across the valley and it was not an ideal day for bombing.
But, starting at dawn, the Allied bombers made eight sorties low into the valley and when they got through, the hair-pin road along which the Axis transport was concentrated was pock-marked with bomb craters.
I talked to the returning pilots and they said most of the enemy vehicles were stationary and some of them immobilized by the fury of the Allied attack.
The Germans threw an attack against Allied lines above Beja Sunday, using about 10 Mark IV tanks. British Churchill tanks rolled out to oppose them and knocked out three and perhaps four of the Mark IV’s. A heavier enemy attack may come, however, because a force of about 30 German tanks was seen just off the Beja road.
Allied air power was thrown against the Germans as early as Saturday, and ground troops then reoccupied two important positions.
The British early Saturday morning took Fort McGregor—named after a young American lieutenant from Brooklyn—south of Medjez-El-Bab. The American garrison of Fort McGregor was withdrawn some time ago.
The Germans took it Friday. Crack German tank forces and other elements penetrated through a dry river bed to the south. The British surprised them with a counterattack, killed 40 and captured 60.
The British reoccupied Tally-Ho corner after the Germans withdrew into the hills east of the Medjez-El-Bab – El-Aroussa road during the night. When darkness came Saturday, the British were mopping up a few remnants halfway along the road.
The attack toward Beja made little progress Saturday, and was heavily bombed and shelled. The Germans sent forces of roughly a battalion (1,000 men) through the hills between the Beja-Mateur and Beja-Medjez-El-Bab road, intending to cut around the latter around over Zarga. By Saturday night, the battalion had not been in contact with the British, although artillery had shelled the Germans heavily.
Germans Use Planes
The Germans have been using their planes liberally to attack Allied positions and shoot up transport behind the front. They attacked Tally-Ho corner three times without much result.
Roughly, it was estimated the Germans threw 13 battalions (13,000 men), with supporting troops of two divisions (perhaps 30,000 men) into the action on the northern front, but paradoxically, fighting was more restricted Saturday than the day before.
Of an estimated 50 German and Italian tanks involved, It was estimated that at least 15 to 20 have been knocked out.