“Lessons Learned” by U.S. Eighth Air Force fighters against German flak taken from Light, Intense, and Accurate: U.S. Eighth A.F. Strategic Fighters Versus German Flak in the ETO, Headquarters, 65th Fighter Wing, August 1945. The booklet was the work of Lt. Col. San Souci and Capt. William D. Thurston, assisted by Lt. Col. R. F. Kennedy, Wing A-2.
CHAPTER XI: LESSONS LEARNED
In fighting back at light flak, Enemy No. 1 of our fighters in the Eighth Air Force, we all learned a great deal. Operating as we did in East Anglia in England, a tight little area crowded to capacity with strategic air units, we were ideally situated to analyze, discuss and record what we learned over a considerable period of time. Our military communications net was perhaps the finest that ever existed in any combat zone, and the exchange of information among units left little to be desired.
Some of the lessons that grew out of this particular situation are worth setting down in a list, followed in Chapter XII by recommendations based on our experience:
1. Specialization in Fighters is a Myth. Anyone using fighters in a strategic air force might just as well make up his mind in the beginning that before it’s over his pilots will come up against every type of defense the enemy has. It was an error in the early days in the ETO to assume that high-level escort fighters would not be bothered by light flak. Ultimately we had to prepare to meet it, and we should have started sooner than we did.
2. Photo Interpretation is Reliable in Locating Flak. Our own experience as we went along, and investigations on the ground in Germany after the war, both proved that the flak defenses pin-pointed by photo reconnaissance were over 90% correct.
3. Reconnaissance Must be Continuous. It is obvious that frequent photos of every area reached by the strategic air force are absolutely essential in order to keep abreast of the fluid flak situation.
Three views of the German 105-mm howitzer (10.5 cm leFH 18, leichte FeldHaubitze) from the U.S. War Department technical manual TM E9-325A: German 105-mm Howitzer Materiel, June 1944.
German 105-mm Howitzer and Carriage, Firing Position
A photograph of a destroyed German self-propelled 37-mm antiaircraft gun mounted on a halftrack, along with a late-model RSO towing an antitank gun. Source: Light, Intense, and Accurate, Headquarters, 65th Fighter Wing, August 1945.
Further artwork and details have been released by AFV Club on their upcoming 1/35th scale release of the U.S. WWII 105mm Howitzer M2A1 & Carriage (Kit No. AF 35160).
Statistical analysis of Luftwaffe air attacks on ground targets in the Third U.S. Army from Antiaircraft Artillery: A Brief History of Operations in Europe, 1 August 1944 to 8 May, 1945, Third United States Army.
German Air Tactics Against Ground Targets in the Third U.S. Army Area
1. Prior to the allied landings of the continent, 6 June 1944, a great deal already was known of the tactics of the German Air Force in attacking ground targets. Attacks of appreciable size had occurred in Italy and Sicily and along the North African coast, and some time had been devoted to their study. Targets of opportunity in forward areas received 63% of attacks, highways and bridges received but 4% of attention, and ports and harbors, airfields and ammunition dumps received 33%, 55% of attacks were by dive-bombing, 20% level-bombing, 10% strafing, 12% unknown, and 3% reconnaissance flights. Bombers made much use of cloud cover and the blinding effect of the bright sun in making their approaches to the target areas. In brief, strong, close-in defenses of all vital objectives seemed dictated by past Luftwaffe performances, with forward zones of divisions, and roads and bridges being of prime importance. An adequate alert status and an efficient warning system were necessary to guard against surprise.
2. Experiences in Italy were, to a certain extent, repeated during the course of Third U.S. Army’s operations on the continent from 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945. Thus, during periods of rapid and threatening advance, armored spearheads were continually attacked by large numbers of low-flying aircraft which attempted to blunt their thrusts. As rivers were reached, emphasis turned to attacks upon the bridges and crowded bridge areas. It the air effort was particularly large, much of it spilled over into troop and artillery areas of infantry divisions following the armor. Little if any air activity was encountered behind corps rear boundaries during such times. Sole large-scale exception to this was during the initial break-through drive of Third U.S. Army’s VIII Corps down the Cotentin Peninsula. During that period, from 1 August to 12 August 1944, the GAF made a frenzied effort that struck night and day not only at the spearheading armor and motorized infantry, but at bridges, road defiles, dams and antiaircraft behind them up and down the historic Avranches supply route Thus, targets were chosen because of their vital importance, and merely vulnerable targets, such as supply dumps, airfields, and the like were left almost untouched.
3. During periods of comparatively little forward movement, such as occurred along the Moselle River in France, there were few attacks made but, weather permitting, reconnaissance was flown almost daily over division and corps zones while some nuisance strafing and bombing of artillery positions occurred.
The website Army Book of Memories tells the story of the 143rd AAA Gun Battalion during WWII from training through the fighting in the Ardennes Offensive and on to V-E Day. The website also includes photographs and a copy of the rare 143rd AAA’s unit history booklet which was published in 1945 after the end of the war.
A report on the activities of antiaircraft gun battalions in the antitank role during the Battle of the Bulge reproduced from “Antiaircraft Artillery Notes,” HQ ETO, No. 15, January 1945:
Subject: Employment of AAA in Anti-tank Role
Source: AA Section, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group
During the recent German Ardennes offensive the 110th and 143rd AAA Gun Battalions, and Battery D, 639th AAA AW Battalion, were placed in anti-tank support of the 30th Infantry Division, in the Malmedy-Stavelot-Stoumont sector. The Division has submitted a report of the activities of these units, and made recommendations for future employment of AAA in an anti-tank role, (See ETOUSA AAA Notes No. 14 for a detailed account of the activities of the 143rd AAA Gun Bn during this action.)
Report of 30th Infantry Division
a. The above listed units were attached to the Division at 210030A December 1944. Prior to daylight of the 21st, liaison was established with the Division by the 11th AAA Group, and by each of the attached units. Upon the arrival of these representatives they were given maps of the area and were fully informed of the tactical situation. A map reconnaissance was made, and officers from the supporting tank destroyer battalion accompanied the antiaircraft officers on their ground reconnaissance, and assisted in the actual placing of their guns in firing positions.
Observation post and command post security from Combat Lessons, No. 7:
OP and CP Security
Even at this late date, needless casualties, delays, and expenditures of effort are being caused by breaches of OP and CP security rules. The inevitable results of security carelessness are pointedly illustrated by the three following incidents.
Carelessness Costs Lives
Reported by Technician Fifth Grade Ernest J. Langle, 135th infantry: “We stayed in one CP for 2 weeks without drawing a shell and felt quite secure, for we had been told that the enemy hadn’t been shelling in that particular vicinity for the past 30 days. Eventually, however, a few of the men either forgot or disregarded their instructions. They washed some white towels and shirts and hung them out to dry—an effective signal for enemy artillery fire upon our CP. Three of our men were killed in the shelling that followed this breach of security.”
Learning Security the Hard Way
Reported by an Infantry Battalion Commander, ETO: “After being shelled out of two CP locations (the first time with severe casualties) we reorganized a sadly depleted CP group and opened for business in another building. A third-story battalion OP in the same building could be reached only by passing a large open window on a stair landing. Since the entire village was under enemy observation and direct fire, it was necessary to crawl past this open window. To insure that this would be done, a sentry was stationed in the stairway. All went well until it was discovered that the Sergeant Major had just covered the opening with a huge sheet of tin ‘so that the sentry could be released for work with the wire team.’ We abandoned the CP in haste and moved to an already established alternate CP (the only remaining location in the town). The last men had hardly left the building before it was taken under direct artillery fire and rapidly disintegrated.
“This incident thoroughly impressed our personnel with the folly of signalling OP and CP locations to the enemy by altering the outward appearance of a building after occupancy. That particular error was not repeated.”
One Mistake Is Too Many
Reported by the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division: “Officers visiting front-line units should be warned against actions that might reveal to the enemy the locations of our installations.
“In one case, an observation post was located in a wrecked building. Inside walls of the rooms had been camouflaged to give a dark background, instruments had been set well back in the rooms, the observers were careful to move about only in the shadows. All went well until the day when some visiting officers stopped by. They moved about freely, even leaning out of the windows with their field glasses. Within half an hour, the building was completely destroyed by enemy fire. One of our observers was killed.”
The Haunted Tank Showcase Vol. 1
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