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By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on February 5th, 2012%
The following report on the German StG 44 (Sturmgewehr 44) assault rifle was published in Foreign Military Weapons and Equipment, Vol. III, Infantry Weapons, Pamphlet No. 30-7-4, Department of the Army, 1954.
7.92-mm Submachine Gun MP-44
(STURMGEWEHR M44)
The German MP44 was developed in 1942 to provide an intermediate weapon between the rifle and the submachine gun. The standard 7.92-mm rifle cartridge was shortened and bottle-necked to take a 120-grain boattail bullet. With this cartridge the weapon provided better ballistic characteristics than those available with the standard German 9-mm submachine guns. It also had provisions for full automatic fire and thus a greater firepower capability.
Ease of mass production was achieved by the extensive use of steel stampings. The receiver, frame, gas cylinder, and barrel jacket are all made from stampings. The parts of the trigger mechanism are riveted in place; therefore, the trigger assembly cannot be disassembled, although a complete trigger mechanism can be quickly inserted into the weapon.
Despite its cheap construction, it is a very serviceable weapon. The various models of this weapon, including the MP43, MP43/1, and the MP44, were all designated the STURMGEWEHR 44 in 1944. They differ only in minor detail. Ballistically, they are identical.
This weapon can be recognized by: (1) The stamped receiver and barrel jacket; (2) the prominent front sight base; (3) the curved, stamped magazine; (4) the gas cylinder on top of the barrel; and (5) the short, bulky buttstock.
Large numbers of these weapons were captured by the Soviets during World War II, and many probably are still held in reserve stocks.
RECOGNITION FEATURES
Continue reading Sturmgewehr 44 Assault Rifle
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 27th, 2011%
Two detail views of the WWII jeep cargo trailer from ORD 8 SNL G-529: Spare Parts and Equipment for Trailer, ¼-Ton Payload, 2-Wheel, Cargo, 1942-42 (American Bantam T-3 and Willys MBT), Headquarters, Army Service Forces, July 1945.
 FIGURE A—TRAILER, 1/4-TON PAYLOAD, 2-WHEEL, CARGO, 1942-43, AMERICAN BANTAM T-3 AND WILLYS MBT THREE QUARTER RIGHT REAR VIEW  FIGURE B—TRAILER, 1/4-TON PAYLOAD, 2-WHEEL, CARGO, 1942-43, AMERICAN BANTAM T-3 AND WILLYS MBT THREE QUARTER RIGHT FRONT VIEW
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 25th, 2011%
Front and rear views of the M55 quad .50 cal. mount and trailer from ORD 7 SNL G-220: Organizational Spare Parts and Equipment for Mount, Trailer, Multiple Cal. .50 Machine Gun, M55, Ordnance Supply Catalog, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, June 1945.
 FIGURE 1—MOUNT, TRAILER, MULTIPLE CAL. .50 MACHINE GUN, M55 (FRONT VIEW) Continue reading M55 Quad .50 cal Mount and Trailer
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 24th, 2011%
Organization of the WWII German Luftwaffe from the U.S. War Department’s Handbook for Combat Air Intelligence Officers, Army Air Forces Air Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, March 1944.
2. ORGANIZATION.
a. General.
(1) The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) is one of three branches of the German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) and is organized and administered independently of the Army and the Navy.
(2) The Luftwaffe itself is divided into three parts: air, air signal, and antiaircraft artillery. Included in the Luftwaffe are parachute and airborne troops, air engineers, air medical corps, air police, and certain special air divisions used as regular fighting troops.
(3) Organized on a territorial rather than a functional basis and with operational and administrative commands separated, the GAF achieved a mobility and flexibility which was largely responsible for its initial success. (Organization of the GAF is shown on Chart B.)
Continue reading Organization of the Luftwaffe
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 23rd, 2011%
The U.S. Military Intelligence Service issued the “Campaign Study” series during WWII to summarize lessons from the various campaigns. Written by U.S. observers in the Middle East, Notes and Lessons on Operations in the Middle East (Campaign Study, No. 5, January 1943) drew a number of conclusions about German and British armor operations in North Africa.
In order of importance, the desirable characteristics of armored vehicles are (1) firepower, (2) mobility and mechanical reliability, (3) armor.
The British infantry tank and the U.S. M4 have relatively the same armor. But the British tank with its 2-pounder (40-mm) armament is undergunned; also, it possesses low tactical mobility and is mechanically unreliable. The M4, with its 75-mm high muzzle-velocity gun is effective against German tanks, possesses high tactical mobility, and is mechanically reliable. The M4 is a superior tank; the British infantry tank, because it lacks the first two characteristics, is almost worthless except for a few special operations.
Only after adequate firepower has been provided, and a high degree of mobility, accompanied by mechanical reliability, has been developed, is heavy armor plate for vehicles justifiable. When the first two characteristics are attained, such armor as does not interfere with mobility and reliability should be placed on the vehicle.
Armor is far less important than is generally supposed. Two years’ observation has indicated that if the tank compartment is penetrated, escape of the crew is usually impossible. Even though the tank does not burn, the German shell bursts after penetration, and the explosion destroys the crew. If the tank catches fire–and this is frequently the case–escape of the crew is impossible.
On the other hand, the same field observation indicates that chances of survival in an unarmored vehicle are almost as good as in an armored one, since the moment an unarmored vehicle is attacked the crew can abandon it. The same order of importance applies even more strongly to self-propelled artillery, where light armor is desirable but not essential.
In the race between armor and guns, guns are in the ascendancy.
In 1939 and 1940, German Panzer units overran Poland and Europe; the Allies’ antitank guns could not stop a tank. In 1940, General O’Connor’s infantry tanks were impervious to Italian artillery and antitank weapons. During the past 2 years, however, in the desert and elsewhere, there has been a steady increase in the power of antitank weapons. Today both the British and the Germans have weapons which will stop any tank.
This increase in the effectiveness of antitank guns has caused the tank to become a weapon of opportunity, to be used only against objectives which it can easily and quickly destroy. In such a role the tank is becoming more and more dependent on other weapons.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 20th, 2011%
The commander of II Corps published the following comments concerning the combat lessons learned during the advance from the Garigliano River to Rome in Italy in 1943-1944:
HEADQUARTERS II CORPS
In the Field
16 June 1944
Subject: Lessons Learned.
To: Divisions and Separate Unit Commanders, II Corps.
1. A detailed analysis of lessons learned during the II Corps advance from the GARIGLIANO to ROME is being made. This study will be published at an early date. Rather than wait for the publication of the detailed compilation, I wish to give you my comments now so they can be acted upon during the present training period.
a. Towns must be taken from deep flank and rear.
b. The usual practice of battering towns with air and artillery serves little purpose and is extremely wasteful of ammunition and time.
c. The delay caused as by small enemy detachments is out of all proportion to the numbers and means at our disposal. Among other errors committed is our failure to leave roads soon enough and to make a wide enough envelopment or by-pass.
d. The combined use of armored and infantry units has been too cautious. The over-emphasis placed on fire power of tanks during the period when weather and terrain conditions prevented full use of armor has not been overcome and mobility has not been restored to its proper importance in the employment of tanks. Too often a column of tanks has remained inactive on a road, held up by a single SP or AT gun. The time lost waiting for infantry to arrive, deploy and attack the gun could have been reduced 50% or more by a rapid deployment and movement of the tanks or by a wide envelopment which would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun. Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a rod. Again, the time wasted waiting for the arrival and action of tanks could have been materially reduced by early and wide deployment.
e. Not enough use has been made of Air OP’s for reconnaissance purposes. Inasmuch as artillery targets have been relatively few during this pursuit phase, there should have been constant Cub air reconnaissance available to all leading elements.
f. In the long run, speed was made over the high ground, not over the roads or flat lands.
g. Too often commanders of all echelons waited for orders. The rapid advance made the maintenance of communications difficult and resulted in instructions being issued and received based on out of date information. Under such conditions commanders must act on their own responsibility, initiative and judgment. Inactivity is inexcusable.
2. We must be prepared mentally and tactically for a change in the character of combat when we next go into the line for we may encounter strong and bitter resistance. At some date or place the German may seek to make a stand but our constant pressure should greatly hamper him from getting set. The main bodies following our mobile advance detachments must be kept so in hand that they can be employed rapidly in accordance with simple and prepared plans.
3. Speed, not haste, is still the great factor.
GEOFFREY KEYES
Major General, U.S.A., Commanding.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 20th, 2011%
The following report on Allied signal intelligence during Operation Torch and the campaign in North Africa is reproduced from “Intelligence Lessons from North Africa, Operation Torch” by the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, March 1943.
C. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (Y).
20. Any review of the lessons learnt in this campaign in the functioning of Signals Intelligence (British: Wireless Intelligence, generally known as Y) can be divided into three parts:
a. Before landing,
b. After landing and
c. General.
It is proposed to consider the subject under these three heads.
21. Before Landing.
The outstanding lesson learnt was the need for dispatching complete units in the first follow up and not dividing them into roughly two halves between convoys 2 .and 3. This precaution had been taken to avoid the risk of the total loss of the unit, but it is now seen that by dividing the unit or units among several ships of the same convoy the same insurance against total loss is achieved. The advantages are that in the early stages of any campaign the maximum amount of Y cover is necessary as no other day to day source of intelligence exists, and also that the enemy being less security minded when his plans are interfered with, more is given away, all of which may be of exceeding value as the campaign develops. Considerable pressure would have to be exercised on the branch responsible for loading tables, but the advantages of a complete Y unit to the formation commander are such that the highest priority for its inclusion entire should be obtainable.
22. After Landing.
a. Assignment.
As 5 Corps did not land in the first follow up, the Corps Y unit (B-type Section) was attached to 78 Div H.Q. This arrangement worked extremely well, and the smallness of the Div I Staff was compensated by one of the I.O.’s of the Section estimating the value of Y intelligence in terms of I(a). Whenever the same problem arises, it is recommended that the Corps B-type Section be attached to the senior Division acting in quasi Corps role until such time as Corps H.Q. have landed. This is preferable to keeping the unit back until Corps H.Q. have landed partly for the reasons mentioned in para. 21 and partly because no Y unit can produce intelligence the moment it sets up house. This is due to the necessity for sorting the traffic heard (since all major wireless bands are full of’ traffic, much of which can be, heard even when the transmitter is many hundreds of miles away). The two mobile D/F trucks now part of every B-type Section have a considerable part to play in this preliminary sorting process.
b. B-type Section (1942).
The revised B-type Section (1942) is an undoubted improvement on the 1941 edition. This has only been partly evident so far, as the Section with 5 Corps is on the old establishment as regards personnel and transport but on the new one as regards equipment. Had the Section been completely on the new establishment it would undoubtedly have produced more; if not better, results. The strain on too few operators coping with increased sets has resulted in a certain amount of: sickness-due to overkeenness on their part.
c. Communications.
The need for adequate communications facilities between all Sections of the Y Service cannot sufficiently be stressed. Y must be provided with its own W/T communications as quite apart from the need for passing intelligence (in high grade cypher) it cannot function properly unless technical information is continually passing between all its units and I(s) at higher levels. The normal Signals channels can sometimes cope with the intelligence side, rarely with the technical information which is often required in the form of “question and answer”.
A further point is that communication should be authorized from the start with G.H.Q. of adjacent theater or theaters. Owing to special cyphers for Y intelligence issued to this H.Q. not being made available to G.H.Q. Middle East, much valuable assistance from Mideast in the early stages could not be received.
d. Siting of Units.
The siting of Y units provided many difficulties owing to the mountainous nature of the ground. Not until recently has a general move forward of higher formations taken place so that the problem has constantly been where to site units so that they fulfill their two main functions
(1) of taking the traffic required.
(2) of passing it in shortest time to the Intelligence Branch of the formation to which assigned.
The only general answer possible is that units may have to be sited near a lower formation than is customary, reporting over their own links to the higher formation to which they belong. (The alternative of a Signal Center does not work well in practice as the lines are usually overloaded no matter what priority is assigned to Y units.)
23. General.
The following points of a more general application are grouped together for convenience though not necessarily inter-related.
a. Inclusion of ‘veterans’.
An immense advantage would accrue in any future operation by the inclusion of personnel from units with battle experience on the strength of new units first coming out. Experience counts more in Y work than is generally realized. A judicious interlarding with Mideast personnel in units fresh from home would have been of great value in this operation.
b. I a Training for I.O.’s.
Y I.O.’s trained in U.K. need to be more Ia minded. A detailed Order of Battle knowledge is an invaluable asset to any I.O. and more stress on this might be laid. It is also necessary for the Y I.O. to know what is, and is not, important to Ia so that his choice of information to pass back immediately may be right. So much of the intelligence produced by Y is ‘scrappy’ (due to difficulties of reception, new or only partially broken codes and the like) that the selection of the right ‘straw’ to indicate the wind is not always apparent. It is recommended therefore: that all I.O.’s in Y should at some period — preferably after being Y trained — serve an attachment of some weeks duration at Ia of a formation, preferably Corps or Division.
c. Intelligence School.
Soon after the start of any operation such as this provision should be made at G.H.Q. for a small “Intelligence School” to read all logs from Y units in the theater, to produce wireless network diagrams from them to check callsigns serial and row changes and generally to be responsible for the longer term W/T I. Sections in the field have little opportunity for more then short term W/T I and in times of battle practically none at all. Investigation into map reference systems, code systems, and the like cannot be undertaken locally but must be done centrally. This is a very real need and should be catered for in any future operation. This party should normally arrive simultaneously with the Army A-type Section.
d. Pool of Reinforcements.
An adequate pool of reinforcements should be drawn up and included in all future operations. In this theater only two W/T I Other Ranks were provided and were absorbed soon after landing leaving no reinforcements whatsoever. On the Signals side the scale is also too low and requires reconsideration. Any loss of personnel through enemy action or sickness is immediately reflected in the operational output of the unit. The ideal solution would be the dispatch of one complete B-type Section over and above those assigned to Corps. This unit could then relieve Corps Sections in rotation either in whole or in part and provide all grades of reinforcements as required.
e. American Y Units.
All the above remarks have been confined to British units as the participation of complete American units in this theater has not yet materialized. The American Section with British W/T I personnel has acquitted itself well in spite of many handicaps due to faults inherent in the general organization of American field Y units. This subject is one however which needs to be investigated at a higher level and a joint American-British Committee might well at some later stage be charged with examining the problem in the light of British experience and American difficulties.
24. Conclusion.
In the main the plans made, the training of the units and the results achieved have been entirely satisfactory. The improvements suggested above are chiefly concerned with detail and should without undue difficulty be capable of realization.
25. I.S. Staff at Army H.Q.
It is considered that only one I(s) Staff Officer is needed at Army H.Q. until the arrival of the A-type Section.
26. Water Trailer for A-type Special Wireless Section.
A-type Special Wireless Section has a strength of 54 all ranks and only sixteen 2-gallon containers to hold drinking water. For technical reasons, the section is often sited in remote areas where the problem of obtaining drinking water is great.
It is considered that a water trailer is essential for the section.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on June 25th, 2011%
Side and rear views of the M51 quad .50 cal. mount and trailer from ORD 7 SNL G-217: Organizational Spare Parts and Equipment for Carriage, Multiple Cal. .50 Machine Gun, M51, Ordnance Supply Catalog, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, October 1944. The M51 was composed of the M17 trailer and the M45 multiple .50 cal. mount.
 FIGURE 1—CARRIAGE, MULTIPLE CAL. .50 MACHINE GUN, M51—SIDE VIEW Continue reading M51 Multiple Machine Gun Carriage
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on April 5th, 2011%
Organization of the WWII Japanese Army Air Service and Naval Air Service from the U.S. War Department’s Handbook for Combat Air Intelligence Officers, Army Air Forces Air Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, March 1944.
3. ORGANIZATION.
a. General.
(1) Owing to the excellence of Japanese counterintelligence during the years in which they were building their air strength, and owing to the difficulty of the Japanese language, Allied information about the organization of the Japanese Air Services is scanty and possibly inaccurate. (Charts C and D give the latest information available about the organization of both the Army and Naval Air Services.)
Continue reading Organization of the Japanese Air Force
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on February 7th, 2011%
A German Wehrmacht article on the redesignation of panzers from the German WWII publication Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen, Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, No. 17, November 1944:
III. Neubenennung gepanzerter Fahrzeuge
Nachstehend aufgeführte Neubenennungen treten mit sofortiger Wirkung in Kraft:
| Bisherige Bezeichnung | | Neue Bezeichnung | | le. Pz. Jg. 38 t | | Jagdpanzer 38 | | Sturmgeschütz III | | Sturmgeschütz III | | Sturmgeschütz IV | | Sturmgeschütz IV | | Sturmhaubitze | | Sturmhaubitze | | Sturmpanzer | | Sturmpanzer | | le. Pz. Jg. IV | | Jagdpanzer IV | | s. Pz. Jg. V | | Jagdpanther | | s. Pz. Jg. VI | | Jagdtiger | | Panzer IV | | Panzer IV | | Panzer IV lang | | Panzer IV lang |
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Forces of Valor U.S. P-51D Mustang
Forces of Valor U.K. Spitfire MK IX
Forces of Valor Japanese Mitsubishi Type Zero
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