Operating instructions for the Bazooka in tropical and arctic climates from TM 9-294: 2.36-inch A.T. Rocket Launcher M1A1, War Department Technical Manual, Sept. 27, 1943.
Section X: OPERATION UNDER UNUSUAL CONDITIONS
32. GENERAL.
a. When operating under unusual conditions such as tropical or arctic climates, severe dust or sand conditions, and near salt water, it is essential that all the precautions listed below should be observed.
33. ARCTIC CLIMATES.
a. In temperatures below freezing, and particularly in arctic climates, all operating parts should he kept absolutely free of moisture. The bore of the launcher should be cleaned daily and oiled as described in paragraph 16. The batteries should be removed from the launcher and kept warm until just before firing. Carrying the batteries in inner pockets will keep them sufficiently warm. Immediately upon bringing indoors, the launcher should be cleaned on the outside and inside with a dry clean cloth. Remove the grips and clean and dry the contacts. After it has reached room temperature, clean and dry the launcher again, and oil the bore. Rockets should not be fired at temperatures below zero F.
34. TROPICAL CLIMATES.
a. Tropical Climates. In tropical climates where temperature and humidity are high, or where salt air is present, and during rainy seasons, the launcher should be thoroughly inspected and cleaned daily. The bore should be oiled a little more liberally than prescribed in paragraph 16. Wood parts should be inspected to see that swelling due to moisture does not bind working parts. If this does occur, shave off only enough wood to relieve binding. A light coat of OIL, linseed, raw, type A applied at least every month and well rubbed in with the heel of the hand, will help to keep moisture out. Allow oil to soak in for a few hours and then, wipe and polish the wood with a dry clean wiping cloth. Do not fire rockets at temperatures above 120 F.
NOTE: Care should be taken to see that linseed oil does not get onto electric contacts as it will gum when dry.
b. Hot Dry Climates. In hot dry climates, where sand and dust are apt to get into the bore, the launcher including the bore should be wiped clean daily or more often if necessary. Oiling of the bore should be done very sparingly and only in the event that atmospheric conditions cause rusting of the bore surface. In such climates, wood parts are apt to dry out and shrink, and a more frequent application of OIL, linseed, raw, type A, will help keep wood in condition. During sand or dust storms the breech and muzzle should be kept covered. Do not fire rockets at temperatures above 120 F.
The following report on the German StG 44 (Sturmgewehr 44) assault rifle was published in Foreign Military Weapons and Equipment, Vol. III, Infantry Weapons, Pamphlet No. 30-7-4, Department of the Army, 1954.
7.92-mm Submachine Gun MP-44 (STURMGEWEHR M44)
The German MP44 was developed in 1942 to provide an intermediate weapon between the rifle and the submachine gun. The standard 7.92-mm rifle cartridge was shortened and bottle-necked to take a 120-grain boattail bullet. With this cartridge the weapon provided better ballistic characteristics than those available with the standard German 9-mm submachine guns. It also had provisions for full automatic fire and thus a greater firepower capability.
Ease of mass production was achieved by the extensive use of steel stampings. The receiver, frame, gas cylinder, and barrel jacket are all made from stampings. The parts of the trigger mechanism are riveted in place; therefore, the trigger assembly cannot be disassembled, although a complete trigger mechanism can be quickly inserted into the weapon.
Despite its cheap construction, it is a very serviceable weapon. The various models of this weapon, including the MP43, MP43/1, and the MP44, were all designated the STURMGEWEHR 44 in 1944. They differ only in minor detail. Ballistically, they are identical.
This weapon can be recognized by: (1) The stamped receiver and barrel jacket; (2) the prominent front sight base; (3) the curved, stamped magazine; (4) the gas cylinder on top of the barrel; and (5) the short, bulky buttstock.
Large numbers of these weapons were captured by the Soviets during World War II, and many probably are still held in reserve stocks.
The U.S. Navy had their own series of training posters called “Lubbers Don’t Live”. This poster stars Whistlin’ Joe who goes overboard with a swish.
Oh heed the fate of Whistlin’ Joe! // Forgot the life lines were so low. // Back home the WAC’s were his pet rave; // But he went overboard for a WAVE!
Another “Don’t Be A Dope” training poster starring Joe Dope:
When the Stukas begin to attack Ain’t the time to make up for a lack Of cleaning your gun - Which won’t shoot at a Hun With a month’s gummy dust on its back! CLEAN IT EVERY 3 DAYS
Gliders used in Operation Market Garden are retrieved from Holland to be used again in future airborne operations. A special glider pickup device is used to allow the gliders to be retrieved without landing the tow plane.
“Guardians of the Sky” from C.I.C. (Combat Information Center), U.S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Vol. I, No. 6, August 1944.
Guardians of the Sky
An enemy raid is being tracked on the display plot in this "action shot" of an Air Defense Control Center at Bougainville. Liaison officers have alerted the base. Island and Air Command, AA Batteries, and ADCC's of other bases and ships. The Fighter Director Officer has assigned the raid to an intercept officer (not in the picture) who, from an intercept table or PPI, is vectoring fighters to intercept the raid.
An Air Combat Intelligence officer briefs the pilots before they go out on a mission. Their tense attitude shows that they know from experience how vital is the information which he is giving them on landmarks, radar evasion, enemy opposition to be expected, weather conditions enroute, communications procedures, and plan of attack.
During the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans disguised several Panther tanks as U.S. M10 tank destroyers (“Ersatz M10″). Part of the Operation Greif created and commanded by Otto Skorzeny, Panzer Brigade 150 deployed these Panther Ausf. G tanks which had been extensively modified and painted to resemble U.S. M10 tank destroyers.
The history of the bazooka from U.S. Rocket Ordnance: Development and Use in World War II, U.S. Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy, 1946.
Bazooka Versus Tank
Among the now-it-can-be-told weapons of the American rocket family, is the super-bazooka, bigger and better version of the foot-soldier’s famed tank-buster.
By their surrender, the Germans and Japs missed feeling the impact of a rocket which travels at almost twice the speed and carries double the explosive payload of the standard bazooka projectile; which has an effective range of as much as 700 yards, instead of the 200 to 300 yards of the regular bazooka; and which can function safely through a considerably wider temperature range, thus affording greatly increased protection against the dangers of motor explosion and blast. Though the super-bazooka retains the 2.36-inch diameter of the original bazooka, and is fired from the same launcher, it is propelled by a larger motor, and its heavier explosive charge can penetrate thicker armor plate.
Another development of the original bazooka-still secret at the war’s end-is a super-powered rocket of 3.5 inches in diameter with greatly increased power to penetrate armor plate and reinforced concrete.
The super-bazooka was the joint product of Section H, which produced the design for the motor, and Division 8 of NDRC, which developed the far more powerful head. The 3.5-inch rocket was designed by the Army Ordnance Department.
Bazooka Development
To arm United States infantry to fight tanks on more nearly equal terms, the Army Ordnance Department, in early 1941, had under development a rifle grenade, carrying a “shaped charge” of high explosive. A cone-shaped cup hollowed in the front face of the explosive filling focussed the blast energy into a narrow beam of great penetrating power.
These rifle grenades had too much recoil for field use as a shoulder weapon. Recoilless rocket propulsion was suggested, tried, and adopted. Colonel Skinner, then an Ordnance Department major, and Lt. (now Major) E. G. Uhl, with Section H at Indian Head, undertook the development of a suitable rocket motor.
Following unsuccessful attempts to launch these rocket grenades from attachments to the service rifle, it was concluded that a separate launcher would be required.
To protect the gunner from the rocket blast, the launching tube had to be longer than the maximum burning distance of the rocket motor. To be portable and easily aimed from the shoulder, the launcher, and hence the burning distance, had to be short. By the use of a charge of several thin-web tubular grains of solvent extruded powder in a motor about an inch in diameter, the burning distance was made short enough for a 54-inch launcher, soon dubbed “the bazooka.”
“Lessons Learned” by U.S. Eighth Air Force fighters against German flak taken from Light, Intense, and Accurate: U.S. Eighth A.F. Strategic Fighters Versus German Flak in the ETO, Headquarters, 65th Fighter Wing, August 1945. The booklet was the work of Lt. Col. San Souci and Capt. William D. Thurston, assisted by Lt. Col. R. F. Kennedy, Wing A-2.
CHAPTER XI: LESSONS LEARNED
In fighting back at light flak, Enemy No. 1 of our fighters in the Eighth Air Force, we all learned a great deal. Operating as we did in East Anglia in England, a tight little area crowded to capacity with strategic air units, we were ideally situated to analyze, discuss and record what we learned over a considerable period of time. Our military communications net was perhaps the finest that ever existed in any combat zone, and the exchange of information among units left little to be desired.
Some of the lessons that grew out of this particular situation are worth setting down in a list, followed in Chapter XII by recommendations based on our experience:
1. Specialization in Fighters is a Myth. Anyone using fighters in a strategic air force might just as well make up his mind in the beginning that before it’s over his pilots will come up against every type of defense the enemy has. It was an error in the early days in the ETO to assume that high-level escort fighters would not be bothered by light flak. Ultimately we had to prepare to meet it, and we should have started sooner than we did.
2. Photo Interpretation is Reliable in Locating Flak. Our own experience as we went along, and investigations on the ground in Germany after the war, both proved that the flak defenses pin-pointed by photo reconnaissance were over 90% correct.
3. Reconnaissance Must be Continuous. It is obvious that frequent photos of every area reached by the strategic air force are absolutely essential in order to keep abreast of the fluid flak situation.
Forces of Valor U.S. P-51D Mustang
Forces of Valor U.K. Spitfire MK IX
Forces of Valor Japanese Mitsubishi Type Zero
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