Organization of the Luftwaffe

Organization of the WWII German Luftwaffe from the U.S. War Department’s Handbook for Combat Air Intelligence Officers, Army Air Forces Air Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, March 1944.

2. ORGANIZATION.

a. General.

(1) The German Air Force (Luftwaffe) is one of three branches of the German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) and is organized and administered independently of the Army and the Navy.

(2) The Luftwaffe itself is divided into three parts: air, air signal, and antiaircraft artillery. Included in the Luftwaffe are parachute and airborne troops, air engineers, air medical corps, air police, and certain special air divisions used as regular fighting troops.

(3) Organized on a territorial rather than a functional basis and with operational and administrative commands separated, the GAF achieved a mobility and flexibility which was largely responsible for its initial success. (Organization of the GAF is shown on Chart B.)

German Air Force Organization

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Kagero Aircraft Aces

Kagero “Aircraft Aces” book + decal series covering the aircraft of famous Luftwaffe aces.

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German Air Tactics Against Ground Targets

Statistical analysis of Luftwaffe air attacks on ground targets in the Third U.S. Army from Antiaircraft Artillery: A Brief History of Operations in Europe, 1 August 1944 to 8 May, 1945, Third United States Army.

German Air Tactics Against Ground Targets in the Third U.S. Army Area

1. Prior to the allied landings of the continent, 6 June 1944, a great deal already was known of the tactics of the German Air Force in attacking ground targets. Attacks of appreciable size had occurred in Italy and Sicily and along the North African coast, and some time had been devoted to their study. Targets of opportunity in forward areas received 63% of attacks, highways and bridges received but 4% of attention, and ports and harbors, airfields and ammunition dumps received 33%, 55% of attacks were by dive-bombing, 20% level-bombing, 10% strafing, 12% unknown, and 3% reconnaissance flights. Bombers made much use of cloud cover and the blinding effect of the bright sun in making their approaches to the target areas. In brief, strong, close-in defenses of all vital objectives seemed dictated by past Luftwaffe performances, with forward zones of divisions, and roads and bridges being of prime importance. An adequate alert status and an efficient warning system were necessary to guard against surprise.

2. Experiences in Italy were, to a certain extent, repeated during the course of Third U.S. Army’s operations on the continent from 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945. Thus, during periods of rapid and threatening advance, armored spearheads were continually attacked by large numbers of low-flying aircraft which attempted to blunt their thrusts. As rivers were reached, emphasis turned to attacks upon the bridges and crowded bridge areas. It the air effort was particularly large, much of it spilled over into troop and artillery areas of infantry divisions following the armor. Little if any air activity was encountered behind corps rear boundaries during such times. Sole large-scale exception to this was during the initial break-through drive of Third U.S. Army’s VIII Corps down the Cotentin Peninsula. During that period, from 1 August to 12 August 1944, the GAF made a frenzied effort that struck night and day not only at the spearheading armor and motorized infantry, but at bridges, road defiles, dams and antiaircraft behind them up and down the historic Avranches supply route Thus, targets were chosen because of their vital importance, and merely vulnerable targets, such as supply dumps, airfields, and the like were left almost untouched.

3. During periods of comparatively little forward movement, such as occurred along the Moselle River in France, there were few attacks made but, weather permitting, reconnaissance was flown almost daily over division and corps zones while some nuisance strafing and bombing of artillery positions occurred.

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New Bf 109 G-6 Decals

EagleCals has announced a new decal set for Luftwaffe Bf 109 G-6s.

Erich Hartmann Bf-109 G6EC#132 Bf 109 G-6
Featuring “Yellow 1″ 9./JG 52 piloted by Erich Hartmann, “White 12″ II./JG 51 piloted by Hans Langer, “White 7″ II./JG 51 piloted by Elias Kühlein

 

FW-190 near Frankfurt

U.S. Brig. Gen. George C. McDonald stands in front of a German FW-190 fighter captured near Frankfurt, Germany. (U.S. Air Force Photo)

Luftwaffe Fw 190 Black-and-white Photo 1945

U.S. Air Force Photo


 

New Luftwaffe Bf 109 and Ta 152 H Decals from EagleCals

New decal sets for Luftwaffe Bf 109 F-4/Trop and Ta 152 H from EagleCals:

Eaglecals 130 Bf 109 F-4 Trop Luftwaffe WW2EagleCals #130: Bf 109 F-4/Trop Part 1
Featuring: “White 1″ 4./JG 3 Pilot: Lt. Albert Helm, “Yellow 3″ 6./JG 3 Pilot: Uffz. Frans Schwaiger, “<||” Stab II./JG 27, and “Yellow 10″ II./JG 27
ME 109 Bf 109 Tropical North AfricaEagleCals #131: Bf 109 F-4/Trop Part 2
Featuring: “Red 2″ 8./JG 27, “Yellow 4″ 9./JG 27 Pilot: Obfw. Eberhard von Boremski, “Yellow 14″ 3./JG 27 Hans-Joachim Marseille, and “<<” III./JG 53 Pilot: Major Erich Gerlitz
Eaglecals 133 Luftwaffe TA 152 HEagleCals #133: Ta 152 H Part 1
Featuring: “Green 6″ Stab JG 301 Ta 152 H-0 W. Nr. 150004, “Yellow 7/White 7″ (originally “Yellow 7″ 11./JG 301 then joined Stab JG 301 becoming “White 7″), and “Yellow 1″ and “Yellow 2″ 11./JG 301
Eaglecals 134 Decals for WWII Luftwaffe TA 152 H FightersEagleCals #134: Ta 152 H Part 2
Featuring: “Green 3″/”Yellow 3″, “Green 9″ Stab JG 301, “Green 4″ Ta 152 H-0 originally “Yellow 4″ 11./JG 301, and Orange-Red Ta 152

 

Mistel

Luftwaffe Mistel Ju-88 and Fw-190

U.S. Air Force Photo

A U.S. soldier examines a captured German Mistel aircraft created from a Fw 190 fighter mounted atop a Ju 88 bomber in May 1945. (U.S. Air Force Photo)
 

Captured FW190 Film

Russian training film on the German Focke-Wulf FW190 showing the FW190′s main features, armament, and flight performance:


 

Luftwaffe Uniforms

German Luftwaffe Uniforms of WWII:

German Luftwaffe WW2 Air Force Uniforms

Air Force Uniforms: Officers and Enlisted Men

German WW2 Paratrooper Fallschirmjaeger Uniform

Air Force Uniforms: Miscellaneous

Source: TM-E 30-451: Handbook on German Military Forces, U.S. War Department, 1943.
 

How Radio-Controlled Bombs Were Jammed

The following article was printed in the December 1945 issue of C.I.C. (Combat Information Center) published by the U.S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

How Radio-Controlled Bombs Were Jammed

The long, violent history of this war saw the rise of many new or radically improved weapons, from the magnetic mine in the early days to the “personnel-controlled bomb” (suicide plane) of recent fame. The story of Allied countermeasures to the threat of Axis weapons is in many cases as dramatic as the weapons themselves.

Henschel Hs 293 Missile

German planes carried the radio-guided missiles under their wings.

For instance, take the case of the German radio-controlled bomb. As early as 1941 British Intelligence began receiving reports that the Germans were developing a bomb which could be remotely controlled from a parent aircraft. Development and operational use, however, are two different things, and it was not until August, 1943, that the Luftwaffe was ready to unveil it. A group of corvettes on anti-submarine patrol in the Bay of Biscay were attacked by what was identified as a remotely controlled bomb—a missile resembling a small fighter plane—capable of radical maneuvering both in azimuth and elevation. The parent aircraft were DO217 twin-engined bombers. One of the corvettes was sunk, another damaged. Later in August further highly successful attacks were made against shipping in the Mediterranean and Bay of Biscay. The bomb (designated HS293) was released by the parent plane at altitudes of 3000-5000 feet and ranges of three to five miles from the target. The missile was jet-assisted shortly after its release; its speed, variously estimated at the time, is now known to have been about 325 knots. The controlling operator in the plane was able to follow the bomb visually by observing a light in the tail.

During and immediately following the Salerno landings the German guided missile program moved into high gear. The enemy introduced another type of controlled missile, the FX, a radio-corrected 4400 pound bomb of tremendous power and accuracy, as anyone present in Salerno Gulf at that time will testify. The Luftwaffe caught units of the Italian Fleet racing to reach Allied ports and scored heavily with both HS293 and FX bombs. They attacked Allied shipping in Salerno Gulf, sinking and damaging several British and United States warships, large and small. It was estimated that nearly 50% of the bombs launched were hits or damaging near misses.

At that time radio control was suspected (on the basis of prisoner-of-war reports) but was by no means confirmed. The control hand was supposed to lie in the 20 Mc region, and desperate, hastily improvised jamming effort was concentrated in this band, which seemed to improve morale without affecting the accuracy of the missiles.

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