Lubbers Don’t Live

The U.S. Navy had their own series of training posters called “Lubbers Don’t Live”. This poster stars Whistlin’ Joe who goes overboard with a swish.

Lubbers Dont Live - Whistlin Joe

Oh heed the fate of Whistlin’ Joe! // Forgot the life lines were so low. // Back home the WAC’s were his pet rave; // But he went overboard for a WAVE!
 

Don’t Be A Dope III

Another “Don’t Be A Dope” training poster starring Joe Dope:

Dont be a Dope -  Stuka Attack - Clean You Gun

When the Stukas begin to attack
Ain’t the time to make up for a lack
     Of cleaning your gun -
     Which won’t shoot at a Hun
With a month’s gummy dust on its back!
CLEAN IT EVERY 3 DAYS
 
Don’t be a dope! HANDLE EQUIPMENT RIGHT.
 

Tank Driving — Field Expedients

Tank driver instructions for dealing with mud, thrown tracks, and bellied tanks from From TM 21-306: Manual for the Full Track Vehicle Driver, War Department, August 1946.

CHAPTER 6: FIELD EXPEDIENTS

32. GENERAL. Field expedients are based on a common sense use of the things you have in the field with which to do a job. A few minutes of thought before starting the work often save hours of unnecessary labor.

33. CONTROLLED DIFFERENTIAL. A number of field expedients for full-track vehicles are based on the way the controlled differential works. If your vehicle has thrown or broken one track, you can move the vehicle by holding back on the steering lever on the same side. This throws power over to the side that has the track and your vehicle moves either forward or in reverse. However, if you do not hold back on this steering lever, the vehicle stands still because the power is thrown to the sprocket which is free to turn without the track. Paragraphs 34 through 38 describe several of the most common field expedients.

34. ONE TRACK SPINNING. To move a full-track vehicle which has one track on solid ground and the other spinning in the mud, pull back on the steering lever on the same side as the spinning track. This throws power to the track on solid ground and your vehicle moves out. (See fig. 36.) To move the vehicle in a straight line pull back alternately on the levers.

Tank Stuck in the Mud

Figure 36. When in mud and only one track spins, move the vehicle by holding back on the steering lever on the same side as the spinning track.

Continue reading Tank Driving — Field Expedients

Don’t Be A Dope II

Another humorous “Don’t be a dope!” poster from WWII.

Don't be a Dope Jeep Poster

Don’t be a dope! Handle Equipment Right!
With an air of complete unconcern // Joe Dope speeds his Jeep ’round a turn // And slams on his brakes //At each stop that he makes — // You’d think we had tires to burn!
 

Sure, You Can See the Skipper

Sure, You Can See the Skipper
Source: U.S. Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel Information Bulletin, (“All Hands Magazine”), October 1944.
 

A-26 Crash Landing Procedure

Instructions for crash landing procedures for the Douglas A-26 Invader from the Pilot Training Manual for the A-26 Invader, Headquarters, AAF, Office of Flying Safety.

CRASH LANDING

Douglas A-26 Invader Crash Landing Procedure

Pilot

1. Call crew. “Prepare for crash landing.” (Have crew acknowledge.)

2. Switch on emergency IFF radio transmitter.

3. Release parachute by unbuckling.

4. Tighten safety belt and lock shoulder harness.

5. Salvo bombs. Close bomb bay doors.

6. Make a normal approach. Use up to 3/4 flaps. Always make a wheels-up landing.

7. Slide seat back but still keep rudder control. (Place cushion between chest and control column.)

8. Call rear gunner and warn of “final impact.”

9. Have bombardier pull emergency lever to release cockpit hatch when airplane is just off the ground.

10. Mixture controls to IDLE CUT-OFF.

11. Turn battery and master ignition switches to OFF.

12. Tank selector valves to OFF.

13. Exit through upper hatch opening.

Continue reading A-26 Crash Landing Procedure

When to Salute

The Navy version of “When to Salute” from Bureau of Naval Personnel Information Bulletin, January 1944.

When to Salute, U.S. Navy

Left to Right, Top to Bottom: ENLISTED MEN SALUTE OFFICERS AND JUNIOR OFFICERS SALUTE SENIOR WHEN MEETING, PASSING NEAR, WHEN ADDRESSING, OR BEING ADDRESSED; OFFICERS AND ALL ENLISTED MEN NOT IN FORMATION SALUTE DURING HONORS TO THE FLAG OR PLAYING OF NATIONAL ANTHEM; WHEN SEVERAL OFFICERS ARE SALUTED, ALL SHALL RETURN IT; WHEN OVERTAKING A SENIOR, THE SALUTE SHALL DE GIVEN WHEN ABREAST, WITH “BY YOUR LEAVE, SIR”; WHEN REPORTING (covered); GUARDS SALUTE ALL OFFICERS PASSING CLOSE ABOARD; ON EVERY OCCASION SALUTE THE CAPTAIN, OFFICERS SENIOR TO HIM, SENIOR OFFICERS FROM OTHER SHIPS; MEN AND OFFICERS SALUTE ALL SENIOR U.S. AND ALLIED OFFICERS THEY MAY ENCOUNTER; ENLISTED MEN RISE AND SALUTE WHEN AN OFFICER ENTERS OR LEAVES; RENDER SALUTES DUE THEM TO ALL OFFICERS IN VEHICLES (IF SAFETY PERMITS); ON FIRST DAILY MEETING, ENLISTED MEN SALUTE ALL OFFICERS, JUNIOR OFFICERS SALUTE SENIOR; WHEN OFFICER MEETS DETAIL ASHORE OR AFLOAT, MAN IN CHARGE SALUTES FOR DETAIL; OFFICERS RISE AND SALUTE WHEN A SENIOR ENTERS OR LEAVES; PASSENGERS IN CARS RENDER AND RETURN SALUTE (DRIVER: NO, IF SAFETY IS INVOLVED); SENTRIES AT GANGWAYS SALUTE ALL OFFICES GOING OR COMING OVER SIDE, PASSING CLOSE ABOARD; UPON APPROACH OF OFFICER, ONE CALLS ATTENTION, ALL SALUTE; WHEN OFFICER PASSES NEAR, OFFICER OR PETTY OFFICER IN CHARGE SALUTES, IF NONE PRESENT MEN DO; WHEN COLORS ARE SOUNDED, MAN IN CHARGE OF DETAIL SALUTES: OTHERS AT ATTENTION.
 

II Corps Lessons Learned

The commander of II Corps published the following comments concerning the combat lessons learned during the advance from the Garigliano River to Rome in Italy in 1943-1944:

HEADQUARTERS II CORPS

In the Field
16 June 1944

Subject: Lessons Learned.
To: Divisions and Separate Unit Commanders, II Corps.

1. A detailed analysis of lessons learned during the II Corps advance from the GARIGLIANO to ROME is being made. This study will be published at an early date. Rather than wait for the publication of the detailed compilation, I wish to give you my comments now so they can be acted upon during the present training period.

a. Towns must be taken from deep flank and rear.

b. The usual practice of battering towns with air and artillery serves little purpose and is extremely wasteful of ammunition and time.

c. The delay caused as by small enemy detachments is out of all proportion to the numbers and means at our disposal. Among other errors committed is our failure to leave roads soon enough and to make a wide enough envelopment or by-pass.

d. The combined use of armored and infantry units has been too cautious. The over-emphasis placed on fire power of tanks during the period when weather and terrain conditions prevented full use of armor has not been overcome and mobility has not been restored to its proper importance in the employment of tanks. Too often a column of tanks has remained inactive on a road, held up by a single SP or AT gun. The time lost waiting for infantry to arrive, deploy and attack the gun could have been reduced 50% or more by a rapid deployment and movement of the tanks or by a wide envelopment which would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun. Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a rod. Again, the time wasted waiting for the arrival and action of tanks could have been materially reduced by early and wide deployment.

e. Not enough use has been made of Air OP’s for reconnaissance purposes. Inasmuch as artillery targets have been relatively few during this pursuit phase, there should have been constant Cub air reconnaissance available to all leading elements.

f. In the long run, speed was made over the high ground, not over the roads or flat lands.

g. Too often commanders of all echelons waited for orders. The rapid advance made the maintenance of communications difficult and resulted in instructions being issued and received based on out of date information. Under such conditions commanders must act on their own responsibility, initiative and judgment. Inactivity is inexcusable.

2. We must be prepared mentally and tactically for a change in the character of combat when we next go into the line for we may encounter strong and bitter resistance. At some date or place the German may seek to make a stand but our constant pressure should greatly hamper him from getting set. The main bodies following our mobile advance detachments must be kept so in hand that they can be employed rapidly in accordance with simple and prepared plans.

3. Speed, not haste, is still the great factor.

GEOFFREY KEYES
Major General, U.S.A., Commanding.

 

When Not to Salute

“When Not to Salute” from the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Naval Personnel Information Bulletin, January 1944.

When Not To Salute, U.S. Navy, WWII

Left to Right, Top to Bottom: WHEN UNCOVERED (WITHOUT HEAD DRESS); WHEN IN RANKS (IF ADDRESSED COME TO ATTENTION); WHEN ENGAGED IN GAMES OR ATHLETICS; WHEN PART OF A DETAIL AT WORK; WHEN CARRYING ARTICLES WITH BOTH HANDS; WHEN UNDER ACTUAL OR SIMULATED BATTLE CONDITIONS; IN PUBLIC CONVEYANCES WHEN OBVIOUSLY INAPPROPRIATE; IN PUBLIC PLACES WHERE INAPPROPRIATE (THEATRE, HOTEL, RESTAURANT ETC.); AT MESS (IF ADDRESSED BY OFFICER, SIT AT ATTENTION); AT OARS IN A PULLING BOAT.
 

Mobile Training

A mobile training unit instructs B-17 crew and ground crew in the servicing of the B-17 oxygen system at a U.S. base in England in 1944. The veteran B-17 Flying Fortress “Flak Alley Lil” of the 305th BG is parked in the background. (U.S. Air Force Photo.)

Mobile Training