Three views of the German 105-mm howitzer (10.5 cm leFH 18, leichte FeldHaubitze) from the U.S. War Department technical manual TM E9-325A: German 105-mm Howitzer Materiel, June 1944.
German 105-mm Howitzer and Carriage, Firing Position
Further artwork and details have been released by AFV Club on their upcoming 1/35th scale release of the U.S. WWII 105mm Howitzer M2A1 & Carriage (Kit No. AF 35160).
Observation post and command post security from Combat Lessons, No. 7:
OP and CP Security
Even at this late date, needless casualties, delays, and expenditures of effort are being caused by breaches of OP and CP security rules. The inevitable results of security carelessness are pointedly illustrated by the three following incidents.
Carelessness Costs Lives
Reported by Technician Fifth Grade Ernest J. Langle, 135th infantry: “We stayed in one CP for 2 weeks without drawing a shell and felt quite secure, for we had been told that the enemy hadn’t been shelling in that particular vicinity for the past 30 days. Eventually, however, a few of the men either forgot or disregarded their instructions. They washed some white towels and shirts and hung them out to dry—an effective signal for enemy artillery fire upon our CP. Three of our men were killed in the shelling that followed this breach of security.”
Learning Security the Hard Way
Reported by an Infantry Battalion Commander, ETO: “After being shelled out of two CP locations (the first time with severe casualties) we reorganized a sadly depleted CP group and opened for business in another building. A third-story battalion OP in the same building could be reached only by passing a large open window on a stair landing. Since the entire village was under enemy observation and direct fire, it was necessary to crawl past this open window. To insure that this would be done, a sentry was stationed in the stairway. All went well until it was discovered that the Sergeant Major had just covered the opening with a huge sheet of tin ‘so that the sentry could be released for work with the wire team.’ We abandoned the CP in haste and moved to an already established alternate CP (the only remaining location in the town). The last men had hardly left the building before it was taken under direct artillery fire and rapidly disintegrated.
“This incident thoroughly impressed our personnel with the folly of signalling OP and CP locations to the enemy by altering the outward appearance of a building after occupancy. That particular error was not repeated.”
One Mistake Is Too Many
Reported by the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division: “Officers visiting front-line units should be warned against actions that might reveal to the enemy the locations of our installations.
“In one case, an observation post was located in a wrecked building. Inside walls of the rooms had been camouflaged to give a dark background, instruments had been set well back in the rooms, the observers were careful to move about only in the shadows. All went well until the day when some visiting officers stopped by. They moved about freely, even leaning out of the windows with their field glasses. Within half an hour, the building was completely destroyed by enemy fire. One of our observers was killed.”
Panzerbeobachtungswagen III (Pz Beob Wg III) were German armored, fully-tracked artillery observation vehicles developed on obsolete PzKpfw. III chassis. The hull machine gun and main armament were removed to allow more interior space for radios and equipment. A single machine gun was mounted in the center of the mantlet alongside dummy armament. Approximately 260 Panzer III chassis were modified from Feb. 1943 to April 1944.
The following photographs of Panzerbeobachtungswagen III were included in a confidential SHAEF intelligence publication on German tanks: Summary of German Tanks in Photographs, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, October 1944.
The following combat report by the 258th Field Artillery Battalion described the effect of short-range 155-mm artillery fire against the pillboxes of the Siegfried Line.
HEADQUARTERS, 258TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO 230, U.S. Army 5 October 1944
SUBJECT: Destruction of concrete pillboxes by short range fire from M12, 155mm Gun, SP. TO: Commanding General, XIX Corps, APO 270, U.S. Army
1. Between 26 September 1944 and 2 October 1944 this battalion was assigned to the mission of methodical destruction of all pillboxes which could be located on the front or immediate flanks of the impending attack on the Siegfried Line by the 30th Division.
2. During this period intensive aerial and ground reconnaissance, in conjunction with aerial photo study, revealed 49 pillboxes as potential observable targets.
3. Of this number 43 were attacked by short range M12 fire, 1 by direct fire and 2 by 3″ guns of Co A, 823d TD Bn. M12 adjusted using fuze delay, switching to T105 fuze on obtaining the first target shot. The TD company commander fired using one gun, direct laying, firing both HE with fuze CB, and armor piercing shot. Evidence of penetration was obtained on all 46 targets above. For details of each mission, see accompanying annex.
4. Firing was terminated only on evidence that a penetration has been obtained. It has not yet been possible to verify by close-up examination of the targets whether penetration was accomplished in every instance.
The following U.S. intelligence report on Japanese spin-stabilized rockets and launchers was published in Enemy on Luzon: An Intelligence Summary:
ARMY 20-CM SPIN STABILIZED ROCKET AND TYPE 4 LAUNCHER:
Several of these projectiles, the first Army rockets recovered, and the Type 4 launcher, were used against our troops in the Manila area and east of Manila. The date of manufacture, late 1944, emphasized the trend toward increased use of rockets by the enemy.
In general appearance the launcher was similar to a large trench mortar. It incorporated traversing mechanism in the bipod and employed standard mortar fire-control devices. The tube, 20.3-cm inside diameter and 75 and 5/8 inches long, was open at both ends and contained a hinged opening for insertion of the rocket. It was fired with a 25-foot lanyard attached to a pull igniter.
Army 20-cm SS Rocket and Type 4 Launcher
The explosive head was a thin-walled tube containing nose fuze, booster and filling of cast TNT. The motor threaded onto the explosive head and was equipped with six nozzles canted 25 degrees. The propellant was ballistite ignited by a black powder charge located just forward of the igniter, which screwed into the motor base plate. Projectile and motor had a combined weight of approximately 185 pounds.
Army 20-cm SS Rocket and Type 4 Launcher (Firing)
The rocket was stable in flight, exploded high order, and had an approximate range of 3,200 yards at 800 mils.
Table of German heavy artillery in World War II from Catalog of Enemy Ordnance, U.S. Office of Chief of Ordnance, 1945.
Gun*
Type of Carriage and Traverse
Weight of Equipment (lb.)
Length of Barrel in Calibers
PROJECTILE
Remarks
Max. Range (yds.)
Muzzle Vel. (ft./sec.)
Type**
Weight (lbs.)
15 cm K. in Mrs. Laf.
45
26,000
2,730
H.E. (15 cm K. gr. 18)
94.6
Probably used on platform for coast defense
15 cm K. 18 (149 mm)
Mod. Box Trail 12°
28,459
55
27,040
2,840
H.E. (15 cm K. gr. 18)
94.6
15 cm K. 39 (149 mm)
Split Trail 60°
27,280
55.4
27,040
2,840
H.E. (15 cm K. gr. 18)
94.6
Probably mfd. by Krupp
17 cm K. in Mrs. Laf. 18
Mod. Box Trail 16°
38,500
50
32,370
3,035
H.E.B.C. (17 cm K. gr. 38 Hb.)
138
Krupp, Essen
21 cm Mrs. 18
Mod. Box Trail 16°
36,700
31
18,300
1,854
H.E. (21 cm gr. 18)
249
Krupp, Essen
21 cm K. 38
Field 360°
78,000
50
37,200
2,870
H.E. (21 cm K. gr. 38)
265
360° on platform. Krupp, Essen
21 cm K. 39
Field 360°
74,800
45
32,800
2,620
H.E. (21 cm gr. 40)
278
Skoda design
21 cm K. 39/40 21 cm K. 39/41
Both reported to be very similar to 21 cm K. 39
21 cm K. 42
37,000
2,820
Muzzle brake fitted
24 cm H. 39
Field 360°
59,400
28
19,700
1,970
H.E. (24 cm gr. 39)
365
Skoda design similar to 21 cm K. 39
24 cm H. 39/40
Later version of 24 cm H. 39
24 cm K. 3 (238 mm)
6°
119,000
46 (55?)
41,000
3,248
H.E. (24 cm gr. 35)
331
24 cm K. 18 (238 mm)
Field 6°
118,800
55
40,500
3,180
332
Fires splined projectile, Rheinmetal Borsig
28 cm H.L./12
Static 360°
111,000
12
11,400
1,150
H.E. (28 cm Spr. gr. L./3.5 m. Bdz.)
770
Uses DeBange Type obturator. Obsolete except for coastal defense
28 cm Kst. H.
Static 360°
81,500
12
12,500
1,243
H.E. (28 cm Sprgr. L./3.5 m. Bdz.)
770
Similar to 28 cm. H.L./12. Fires same projectile
35.5 cm M. 1
Field
165,000
21,900
1,870
Anticoncrete (35.5 cm gr. Be.)
825
42 cm Gamma Mrs.
Static 45°
308,000
16
15,500
1,485
Anticoncrete (s. Gr. Be.)
2,249 2,253
Similar to last war equipment
61.5 cm Mrs.
264,000
8
15,300
1,380
Anticoncrete (gaschosse L./4.1 für Karl gerät)
4,400
Reported to have an auxiliary 54 cm barrel
15 cm K. (E)
Rly. 360°
167,000
40
25,200
2,800
H.E. (15 cm K. gr. 18)
94.6
Naval design. Krupp. Same projectile as 15 cm K. 18
17 cm K. (E)
Rly. 360°
176,000
40
29,200
2,870
H.E.B.C. (17 cm Sprgr. L./4.7 Kz. m. Hb.)
138
Naval design. Krupp
20 cm K. (E) (203 mm)
Rly. Turntable 360°
189,500
55
40,000
3,030
H.E.B.C. (20.3 cm Sprgr. L./4.7 m. Hb.)
247
Naval design. Also known as 20 cm S. K. C./34
21 cm K. 12 (E)
Rly.
744,000
196
131,000
5,330
H.E.B.C. (21 cm gr. 35 m. Hb.)
236
Splined projectile. Differences are not known
21 cm K. 12V (E)
Rly.
21 cm K. 12N (E)
Rly.
Believed to involve an alteration of the rifling
24 cm Th. Br. K (E) (238 mm)
Rly. 1°
207,000
35
22,200
2,210
H.E.B.C. (24 cm Sprgr. L./4.5 Bdz. u Kz. m. Hb. ung)
328
Sister piece to “Theodor Kanone”
24 cm Th. K. (E) (238 mm)
Rly.
209,000
40 (48?)
29,000
2,660
H.E.B.C. (24 cm Sprgr. L./4.2 m. Bdz. u Kz. m. Hb.)
330
“Theodor Kanone” Naval design
28 cm Ks. Br. K. (E)
Rly.
262,000
40
32,300
2,690
H.E.B.C. (28 cm Sprgr. L./4.1 Kz. m. Hb.)
529
Naval design. Carriages are believed to be very similar
28 cm lg. Br. K. (E)
Rly.
271,000
45
40,500
2,820
H.E.B.C. (28 cm Sprgr. L./4.4 m. Bdz. u Kz. m. Hb.)
626
Naval design. Carriages are believed to be very similar
28 cm s. Br. K. (E)
Rly.
286,000
50
40,500
2,880
H.E.B.C. (28 cm Sprgr. L./4.4 m. Bdz. u Kz. m. Hb.)
626
Naval design. Carriages are believed to be very similar
28 cm Br. N. K. (E)
Rly.
330,000
50,200
3,260
H.E.B.C. (28 cm Gr. 39 m. Hb.)
496
Probably splined projectile
28 cm K. 5 (E)
Rly. 1° Turntable 360°
480,000
76
63,000
3,670
H.E.B.C. (28 cm Gr. 35)
550
Weight does not include turntable. Fires splined projectile. Also reported to fire a rocket assisted shell (28 cm R. Gr. L/4.7) with range of 53 miles.
28 cm K. 5/1 (E)
H.E.B.C. (28 cm Gr. 42)
Differences from 28 cm K5 are unknown
28 cm K. 5/2 (E)
H.E.B.C. (28 cm Gr. 42)
Differences from 28 cm K. 5 are unknown
38 cm Siegfried K. (E)
Rly. Turntable 360°
55 (52?)
61,000
3,450
H.E.B.C. (38 cm Sprgr. L./4.5) (Si)
1,096
Naval design. Also fires a 1,764 lb. shell with maximum range of 46,000 yds.
40 cm K. (E) (406 mm)
Rly.
710,000
50
49,000
3,450 2,790
H.E. (40 cm gr. 40)
1,320 2,100
Naval design—Adolf. K.
80 cm Gustav Geschütz
2,750,000
35
51,500
16,700
* Almost all the data given have not been verified by tests performed by any Allied government and information from sources available varies considerably in reliability and degree of confirmation. ** Of the several types of projectiles fired by each weapon, only one believed to give maximum range is listed.
From “Combat Lessons” No. 4 comes this tribute to the U.S. artillery spotter planes in World War II:
The Artillery “Jeep Plane”Colonel Russell P. Reeder, Infantry Regimental Commander, Normandy.
“When our division commander asked us what we wanted our reply was ‘Keep those artillery jeep planes in the air.’
“These planes were the most effective means of stopping German artillery fire on our troops. We would be taking a real pasting from their artillery until one of these planes would show up skittering across the sky. Immediately the German artillery would stop firing. After one or two incautious enemy batteries had continued to fire and disclosed their position to the air observer, with ‘sudden death’ results, the others learned that discretion is the better part of valor.
“Even their mortars respected the eagle eye of the jeep plane and would suspend fire rather than risk detection of their positions.”
COMMENT: This disinclination of German artillery to fire under the threat of disclosing their positions to air observers has also been reported from both Sicily and Italy.
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