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By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 24th, 2011%
The story of the SBD Dauntless dive bomber in the Pacific from Bureau of Naval Personnel Information Bulletin, (“All Hands Magazine”), September 1944.
 Jap-hunting SBDs fly in formation over a carrier of Task Force 58 in the Pacific. War Record of the SBD
Dauntless Divebomber, Giving Way to Harder-Hitting Successor, Was Spearhead of Our Attacks in the Pacific
The 5,936th and last of a distinguished strain of aircraft–the Navy’s SBD, which is giving way to a faster, long-range divebomber–rolled off the production line of the Douglas Aircraft Company’s plant at El Segundo, Calif., on 21 July.
Its completion closed a chapter in the history of naval aviation that will be discussed as long as men continue to talk about this war’s great battles in the Pacific.
On 7 Dec. 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, a rear-seat gunner in an SBD knocked down a Zero that may have been the first Jap plane destroyed by U.S. aircraft. From then on the story of the SBD, or Douglas Dauntless divebomber, is closely interwoven with the successes of the fleet.
The enemy first felt the real sting of the SBD when Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., USN, took a small task force into the Gilbert and Marshall Islands in February 1942. Flying again from the deck of the USS Enterprise, as they had at Pearl Harbor, SBDs suddenly appeared over the atolls of those islands in the outer ring of the enemy’s defenses, dived to low altitude and dropped their 1,000-pound bombs on ships, hangars, airstrips and buildings.
The following month this same force staged a repeat performance for the benefit of the Japs on Marcus and Wake Islands.
Continue reading War Record of the SBD
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 20th, 2011%
The commander of II Corps published the following comments concerning the combat lessons learned during the advance from the Garigliano River to Rome in Italy in 1943-1944:
HEADQUARTERS II CORPS
In the Field
16 June 1944
Subject: Lessons Learned.
To: Divisions and Separate Unit Commanders, II Corps.
1. A detailed analysis of lessons learned during the II Corps advance from the GARIGLIANO to ROME is being made. This study will be published at an early date. Rather than wait for the publication of the detailed compilation, I wish to give you my comments now so they can be acted upon during the present training period.
a. Towns must be taken from deep flank and rear.
b. The usual practice of battering towns with air and artillery serves little purpose and is extremely wasteful of ammunition and time.
c. The delay caused as by small enemy detachments is out of all proportion to the numbers and means at our disposal. Among other errors committed is our failure to leave roads soon enough and to make a wide enough envelopment or by-pass.
d. The combined use of armored and infantry units has been too cautious. The over-emphasis placed on fire power of tanks during the period when weather and terrain conditions prevented full use of armor has not been overcome and mobility has not been restored to its proper importance in the employment of tanks. Too often a column of tanks has remained inactive on a road, held up by a single SP or AT gun. The time lost waiting for infantry to arrive, deploy and attack the gun could have been reduced 50% or more by a rapid deployment and movement of the tanks or by a wide envelopment which would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun. Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a rod. Again, the time wasted waiting for the arrival and action of tanks could have been materially reduced by early and wide deployment.
e. Not enough use has been made of Air OP’s for reconnaissance purposes. Inasmuch as artillery targets have been relatively few during this pursuit phase, there should have been constant Cub air reconnaissance available to all leading elements.
f. In the long run, speed was made over the high ground, not over the roads or flat lands.
g. Too often commanders of all echelons waited for orders. The rapid advance made the maintenance of communications difficult and resulted in instructions being issued and received based on out of date information. Under such conditions commanders must act on their own responsibility, initiative and judgment. Inactivity is inexcusable.
2. We must be prepared mentally and tactically for a change in the character of combat when we next go into the line for we may encounter strong and bitter resistance. At some date or place the German may seek to make a stand but our constant pressure should greatly hamper him from getting set. The main bodies following our mobile advance detachments must be kept so in hand that they can be employed rapidly in accordance with simple and prepared plans.
3. Speed, not haste, is still the great factor.
GEOFFREY KEYES
Major General, U.S.A., Commanding.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on January 2nd, 2011%
The following XX Bomber Command combat report on Japanese fighter tactics against the B-29 Superfortress appeared in Eastern Air Command Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 31, March 30, 1945 published by Headquarters Eastern Air Command, Southeast Asia. The report describes a variation of the “12 O’Clock Express” used by one Japanese Oscar pilot.
JAP FIGHTER TACTICS ON B-29 MISSION NO. 41 — SINGAPORE
The following account extracted from XX Bomber Command Summary #9 dated 10 Mar ’45 covering enemy tactics encountered in the B-29 raid against Singapore on 2 Mar ’45, indicates that enemy opposition in this area continued to be’ weak, and that Jap pilots were aggressive in only 26% of the attacks. High frontals were favored and a variation in the “12 O’Clock Express” was noted (see sketch). Zeke 52′s armament was reported as probably increased.
Enemy opposition was rated as weak, as on the three previous missions to Singapore, and Jap pilots did not appear to be aggressive; 45% of the enemy tactics were broken off between 250-500 yds, with only 26% pressing to within distances less than 250 yds. Encounters against the B-29s’ front quarter, where most of the action took place, were predominantly high in approach, but since the number of encounters is so small, XX Bomber Command states that probably no particular importance should be attached to this fact.
Aerial Bombing
The enemy made 11 single plane aerial bombing attacks which resulted in no damage to any of the B-29s. The closest burst occurred at 50 yds off the wing of one of our planes, while most of the bombs exploded 200-400 or more yards away from the formation. Phosphorous and fragmentation bombs were observed by crews with the former in the majority. The method of releasing bombs by Jap fighters consisted of: (1) releasing from level flight; and (2) “flipping” or “slinging”. No dive bombing encounters were reported. Coordinated attacks employed two fighters each.
Variation in “12 O’Clock Express”
One Jap attack which inflicted damage on a B-29 merits elaboration in that it was an unusual variation of the “12 O’Clock Express” and showed an exceptional degree of skill on the part of the enemy pilot. The enemy aircraft was first sighted about two miles out, very high at two o’clock. As the Jap approached to about one mile, he wagged his wings and turned in towards the B-29 at 12 o’clock in a dive. When about 1000 yards above the bomber, the Jap rolled over on his back, came in on a vertical pursuit curve, opening fire at about 500 yards. A 20mm shell went through the root of the left wing of the B-29. The dive was continued, passing within 25 yards of the B-29′s tail. The timing of the attack was exceptionally good, and the pilot almost succeeded in raking the B-29. Crews reported observing a Zeke 52 firing with six guns.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on December 29th, 2010%
Combat lessons from the troops on platoon leadership and NCO efficiency from Combat Lessons No. 9:
Platoon Leadership vs. NCO Efficiency
Orders Must Be Clear
NCO efficiency and squad accomplishment are materially reduced when combat orders fail to give full information and to specify clearly each assignment. Says an Okinawa report: “Junior officers often complicate combat orders. They forget about intermediate objectives which should be the next terrain feature, whether it be a hill, road, or an edge of a rice paddy. They neglect to tell each squad specifically what to do. They take on the responsibilities of NCO’s and scouts and then, finding it impossible to remain continuously in a control position, encourage bunching which results in needless casualties.
 Junior officers often complicate orders. Leaders Are Not Scouts.
“In one regiment, five platoon leaders were killed because their scouts were not out. The platoon leader must realize that he is not a scout and that if he attempts to do that work, it will be at the expense of his control responsibility.
“Invariably, when trying to do their own scouting, the platoon leaders allowed their support squads to get too close to the leading squads and thus sacrificed the platoon’s maneuverability.”
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on December 10th, 2010%
A report on the activities of antiaircraft gun battalions in the antitank role during the Battle of the Bulge reproduced from “Antiaircraft Artillery Notes,” HQ ETO, No. 15, January 1945:
Subject: Employment of AAA in Anti-tank Role
Source: AA Section, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group
During the recent German Ardennes offensive the 110th and 143rd AAA Gun Battalions, and Battery D, 639th AAA AW Battalion, were placed in anti-tank support of the 30th Infantry Division, in the Malmedy-Stavelot-Stoumont sector. The Division has submitted a report of the activities of these units, and made recommendations for future employment of AAA in an anti-tank role, (See ETOUSA AAA Notes No. 14 for a detailed account of the activities of the 143rd AAA Gun Bn during this action.)
Report of 30th Infantry Division
a. The above listed units were attached to the Division at 210030A December 1944. Prior to daylight of the 21st, liaison was established with the Division by the 11th AAA Group, and by each of the attached units. Upon the arrival of these representatives they were given maps of the area and were fully informed of the tactical situation. A map reconnaissance was made, and officers from the supporting tank destroyer battalion accompanied the antiaircraft officers on their ground reconnaissance, and assisted in the actual placing of their guns in firing positions.
Continue reading Employment of AAA in Anti-tank Role
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on December 2nd, 2010%
A report on effective use of DUKWs at the Salerno landings from Combat Lessons, No. 3:
DUKWs at Salerno Report of a Quartermaster Truck Battalion (DUKW), Italy: The DUKWs (amphibious 2½-ton trucks) again proved of immense value at Salerno, supplies and equipment being handled over the beaches at a far greater rate than had been expected. The following points regarding their use should be borne in mind when planning for their use:
1. DUKWs must not be used for long trips inland.
2. Relief drivers and crews must be provided.
3. Definite steps must be taken to prevent overloading. Overloading at Salerno resulted in some being lost by sinking. One method of avoiding this would be to develop standard loads, particularly for ammunition. The load should not exceed 3 tons.
4. Ships to be unloaded should be moved inshore as close as possible, and should take position approximately opposite the beach landing point in order to reduce the turn-around. Unnecessary water travel means unnecessary delay in the discharge of cargo and increases the problem of maintenance.
5. A rigging crew from the DUKW unit should go aboard the vessel prior to unloading and rig the ship with necessary lines and hooks.
6. A great saving in time and labor can be effected if cargo nets are equipped with base plates shaped to fit the cargo space of the DUKW. Where cargo nets are not carried ashore by the DUKW, pallet loads can be used to expedite the discharge of cargo.
7. If possible each DUKW should carry only one type of cargo to avoid wasting time unloading at beach dumps.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 26th, 2010%
A warning about the dangers of the WWII German “Butterfly Bomb” (Sprengbombe Dickwandig 2 kg or SD2) from Booby Traps, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department, Washington D.C., 1944.
German “Butterfly Bomb”
The “butterfly bomb” is the German’s favorite bomb against personnel on beaches, in camps, and against airfields. It is small and light, and can be dropped in great numbers from airplanes. One plane can carry several hundred of these deadly little devices with no trouble at all. As each bomb descends, the fist-sized iron ball full of explosives swings free at the bottom of a rod about the size of a lead pencil. The unfolded fins on the top of the pencil-rod are whirling in the air and turning the rod, thus arming the bomb.
Some “butterfly bombs” explode in the air just above ground, some on hitting the ground, and some incorporate delayed action (about 8 to 30 minutes) which makes everything just dandy for the persons who have to come out after the raid to fight fires. See figs. 8 and 9. That should be enough, but the end is not yet. Part of the crop of “butterflies” will not go off at all until someone disturbs them—picks them up, treads on the wings, or the like. Often the bodies of the bombs will have buried themselves in the soft earth. The only part visible will be the brightly colored (green and red, or green and yellow) upturned wings, like the lovely discarded shells of some crabs or lobsters. What a memento for the office desk back home—but pick it up and you won’t get back home!
As an example of how the “butterfly” can let you down: One night last spring in North Africa the Germans raided a forward area of ours where there happened to be a P.O.W. (prisoner of war) cage full of Germans we had captured that day. Jerry dropped hundreds of “butterfly bombs” and one of them drifted into the P.O.W., settling to earth without going off. Naturally the German prisoners were greatly relieved and shied clear of their own infernal machine. But next morning was a different story. Three of our allied soldiers guarding the P.O.W. came across the little yellow wings, and the pencil rod, and the iron ball.
 Figure 8. Danger lurks for the inquisitive in the form of the German anti-personnel bomb known as the "butterfly." Here is one of these bombs, lying as you might find it in the field. “A-ha!” said one of the guards to his pals. “Something new has been added.”
And while the other two held onto the little iron ball, he tried to unscrew the yellow wings, and up went all three—the German prisoners, watching from a distance, were delighted.
 Figure 9. "Butterfly" in tree. Stay away from this kind of a situation. The bomb may explode through a time device or as a result of any disturbing pressure.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 8th, 2010%
Observation post and command post security from Combat Lessons, No. 7:
OP and CP Security
Even at this late date, needless casualties, delays, and expenditures of effort are being caused by breaches of OP and CP security rules. The inevitable results of security carelessness are pointedly illustrated by the three following incidents.
Carelessness Costs Lives
Reported by Technician Fifth Grade Ernest J. Langle, 135th infantry: “We stayed in one CP for 2 weeks without drawing a shell and felt quite secure, for we had been told that the enemy hadn’t been shelling in that particular vicinity for the past 30 days. Eventually, however, a few of the men either forgot or disregarded their instructions. They washed some white towels and shirts and hung them out to dry—an effective signal for enemy artillery fire upon our CP. Three of our men were killed in the shelling that followed this breach of security.”
Learning Security the Hard Way
Reported by an Infantry Battalion Commander, ETO: “After being shelled out of two CP locations (the first time with severe casualties) we reorganized a sadly depleted CP group and opened for business in another building. A third-story battalion OP in the same building could be reached only by passing a large open window on a stair landing. Since the entire village was under enemy observation and direct fire, it was necessary to crawl past this open window. To insure that this would be done, a sentry was stationed in the stairway. All went well until it was discovered that the Sergeant Major had just covered the opening with a huge sheet of tin ‘so that the sentry could be released for work with the wire team.’ We abandoned the CP in haste and moved to an already established alternate CP (the only remaining location in the town). The last men had hardly left the building before it was taken under direct artillery fire and rapidly disintegrated.
“This incident thoroughly impressed our personnel with the folly of signalling OP and CP locations to the enemy by altering the outward appearance of a building after occupancy. That particular error was not repeated.”
One Mistake Is Too Many
Reported by the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division: “Officers visiting front-line units should be warned against actions that might reveal to the enemy the locations of our installations.
“In one case, an observation post was located in a wrecked building. Inside walls of the rooms had been camouflaged to give a dark background, instruments had been set well back in the rooms, the observers were careful to move about only in the shadows. All went well until the day when some visiting officers stopped by. They moved about freely, even leaning out of the windows with their field glasses. Within half an hour, the building was completely destroyed by enemy fire. One of our observers was killed.”
 You sure have a fine view from this OP, Sergeant.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on October 22nd, 2010%
The following combat report by the 258th Field Artillery Battalion described the effect of short-range 155-mm artillery fire against the pillboxes of the Siegfried Line.
HEADQUARTERS, 258TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
APO 230, U.S. Army
5 October 1944
SUBJECT: Destruction of concrete pillboxes by short range fire from M12, 155mm Gun, SP.
TO: Commanding General, XIX Corps, APO 270, U.S. Army
1. Between 26 September 1944 and 2 October 1944 this battalion was assigned to the mission of methodical destruction of all pillboxes which could be located on the front or immediate flanks of the impending attack on the Siegfried Line by the 30th Division.
2. During this period intensive aerial and ground reconnaissance, in conjunction with aerial photo study, revealed 49 pillboxes as potential observable targets.
3. Of this number 43 were attacked by short range M12 fire, 1 by direct fire and 2 by 3″ guns of Co A, 823d TD Bn. M12 adjusted using fuze delay, switching to T105 fuze on obtaining the first target shot. The TD company commander fired using one gun, direct laying, firing both HE with fuze CB, and armor piercing shot. Evidence of penetration was obtained on all 46 targets above. For details of each mission, see accompanying annex.
4. Firing was terminated only on evidence that a penetration has been obtained. It has not yet been possible to verify by close-up examination of the targets whether penetration was accomplished in every instance.
Continue reading Artillery Against Siegfried Line Pillboxes
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on October 10th, 2010%
Report on a single lucky 40mm shot from “Antiaircraft Artillery Notes,” HQ ETO, No. 15, January 1945:
Subject: More Economical Shooting
Source: AA Section, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group
The 445th AAA AW Bn (M) claims to have at least tied the world’s record for low ammunition expenditure when one of its gun crews shot down an FW 190 on 1 January with one round of 40mm. The plane came over a heavily wooded area at high speed. Because of the limited field of fire, the gun section was able to fire only one round of 40mm ammunition. The shell hit the fuselage behind the cockpit. Fire broke out immediately, and the plane turned off course, out of control. Front line observers saw the plane crash a few seconds later.
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