During the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans disguised several Panther tanks as U.S. M10 tank destroyers (“Ersatz M10″). Part of the Operation Greif created and commanded by Otto Skorzeny, Panzer Brigade 150 deployed these Panther Ausf. G tanks which had been extensively modified and painted to resemble U.S. M10 tank destroyers.
Tank driver instructions for dealing with mud, thrown tracks, and bellied tanks from From TM 21-306: Manual for the Full Track Vehicle Driver, War Department, August 1946.
CHAPTER 6: FIELD EXPEDIENTS
32. GENERAL. Field expedients are based on a common sense use of the things you have in the field with which to do a job. A few minutes of thought before starting the work often save hours of unnecessary labor.
33. CONTROLLED DIFFERENTIAL. A number of field expedients for full-track vehicles are based on the way the controlled differential works. If your vehicle has thrown or broken one track, you can move the vehicle by holding back on the steering lever on the same side. This throws power over to the side that has the track and your vehicle moves either forward or in reverse. However, if you do not hold back on this steering lever, the vehicle stands still because the power is thrown to the sprocket which is free to turn without the track. Paragraphs 34 through 38 describe several of the most common field expedients.
34. ONE TRACK SPINNING. To move a full-track vehicle which has one track on solid ground and the other spinning in the mud, pull back on the steering lever on the same side as the spinning track. This throws power to the track on solid ground and your vehicle moves out. (See fig. 36.) To move the vehicle in a straight line pull back alternately on the levers.
Figure 36. When in mud and only one track spins, move the vehicle by holding back on the steering lever on the same side as the spinning track.
The U.S. Military Intelligence Service issued the “Campaign Study” series during WWII to summarize lessons from the various campaigns. Written by U.S. observers in the Middle East, Notes and Lessons on Operations in the Middle East (Campaign Study, No. 5, January 1943) drew a number of conclusions about German and British armor operations in North Africa.
In order of importance, the desirable characteristics of armored vehicles are (1) firepower,(2) mobility and mechanical reliability, (3) armor.
The British infantry tank and the U.S. M4 have relatively the same armor. But the British tank with its 2-pounder (40-mm) armament is undergunned; also, it possesses low tactical mobility and is mechanically unreliable. The M4, with its 75-mm high muzzle-velocity gun is effective against German tanks, possesses high tactical mobility, and is mechanically reliable. The M4 is a superior tank; the British infantry tank, because it lacks the first two characteristics, is almost worthless except for a few special operations.
Only after adequate firepower has been provided, and a high degree of mobility, accompanied by mechanical reliability, has been developed, is heavy armor plate for vehicles justifiable. When the first two characteristics are attained, such armor as does not interfere with mobility and reliability should be placed on the vehicle.
Armor is far less important than is generally supposed. Two years’ observation has indicated that if the tank compartment is penetrated, escape of the crew is usually impossible. Even though the tank does not burn, the German shell bursts after penetration, and the explosion destroys the crew. If the tank catches fire–and this is frequently the case–escape of the crew is impossible.
On the other hand, the same field observation indicates that chances of survival in an unarmored vehicle are almost as good as in an armored one, since the moment an unarmored vehicle is attacked the crew can abandon it. The same order of importance applies even more strongly to self-propelled artillery, where light armor is desirable but not essential.
In the race between armor and guns, guns are in the ascendancy.
In 1939 and 1940, German Panzer units overran Poland and Europe; the Allies’ antitank guns could not stop a tank. In 1940, General O’Connor’s infantry tanks were impervious to Italian artillery and antitank weapons. During the past 2 years, however, in the desert and elsewhere, there has been a steady increase in the power of antitank weapons. Today both the British and the Germans have weapons which will stop any tank.
This increase in the effectiveness of antitank guns has caused the tank to become a weapon of opportunity, to be used only against objectives which it can easily and quickly destroy. In such a role the tank is becoming more and more dependent on other weapons.
A German Wehrmacht article on the redesignation of panzers from the German WWII publication Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen, Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, No. 17, November 1944:
III. Neubenennung gepanzerter Fahrzeuge
Nachstehend aufgeführte Neubenennungen treten mit sofortiger Wirkung in Kraft:
Top view of the rear engine deck of the M36B2 tank destroyer from TM 9-745: 90-mm Gun Motor Carriage M36B2, War Department Technical Manual, July 1945:
A-GUN TRAVELING LOCK B-LIFTING HOOKS C-LEFT TAILLIGHT D-ENGINE COMPARTMENT DOORS E-ENGINE COMPARTMENT LEFT COVER PLATE F-LEFT WATER EXPANSION TANK FILLER CAP COVER G-LEFT FUEL TANK FILLER CAP COVER H-FIRE EXTINGUISHER EXTERIOR PULL HANDLES J-LEFT (LC) ENGINE LUBRICATING OIL TANK FILLER CAP COVER
K-RIGHT (LA) ENGINE LUBRICATING OIL TANK FILLER CAP COVER L-AUXILIARY GENERATOR FUEL TANK FILLER CAP COVER M-RIGHT WATER EXPANSION TANK FILLER CAP COVER N-RIGHT FUEL TANK FILLER CAP COVER P-ENGINE COMPARTMENT RIGHT COVER PLATE Q-ENGINE COMPARTMENT REAR COVER PLATE R-RIGHT TAILLIGHT
Illustration of correct and incorrect track tension on the M4A2 tank from the M4A2 technical manual. The tank crew were instructed to inspect the track tension regularly and tighten the track if it shows noticeable sag.
Track with insufficient tension
Track with proper tension
Source: TM 9-731B: Medium Tank M4A2, War Department Technical Manual, January 1943.
Summary of the armament of the M36 “Jackson” tank destroyer from the M36B1 technical manual TM 9-748: 90-mm Gun Motor Carriage M36B1, War Department Technical Manual, U.S. War Department, Washington D.C., January, 1945.
ARMAMENT CHARACTERISTICS
a. The armament on the 90-mm Gun Motor Carriage M36B1 is employed chiefly against enemy tanks and other ground objectives. The 90-mm Gun M3 is mounted in the turret. The turret can be traversed 360 degrees manually or by a hydraulic traversing mechanism. The 90-mm gun can be elevated 30 degrees and depressed 10 degrees.
90-mm Gun Motor Carriage M36B1 - Three-quarter Right Front View
b. The cal. .30 machine gun in the front of the gun motor carriage on the right side is elevated and depressed manually, and fired by a conventional trigger. Refer to FM 23-50 for complete information on its operation.
90-mm Gun Motor Carriage M36B1 - Three-quarter Right Rear View
c. The cal. .50 machine gun is employed chiefly against enemy aircraft and is elevated and traversed manually, and fired by a conventional trigger. The machine gun can be traversed independently of the turret. Refer to FM 23-65 for the complete information on its operation.
Details of the external gun traveling lock mounted on the rear of the M36 “Jackson” tank destroyer from the M36B1 technical manual TM 9-748: 90-mm Gun Motor Carriage M36B1, War Department Technical Manual, U.S. War Department, Washington D.C., January, 1945. The travel lock was mounted on the rear engine deck, and the turret was traversed to the rear for extended travel. The travel lock latch is mounted off center and latches through a slot in the travel lock.
GUN TRAVELING LOCK
a. Description. The gun traveling lock is hinged to brackets mounted on the rear engine compartment cover plate. To release the gun from the gun traveling lock, pull down on the release ring and, at the same time, raise the gun. To lock the gun in the gun traveling lock, hold the gun traveling lock jaws in a halfway open position and, at the same time, lower the gun into the gun traveling lock.
b. Replacement. Drive the lock pin from the right-hand side of each bracket. Drive both hinge pins from the brackets and remove the gun traveling lock. Position the gun traveling lock in the brackets and install the two hinge pins, making sure the lock pin hole in the hinge pin is in line with the lock pin hole in each bracket. Install the lock pin in each bracket.
The following correspondent’s report from the UP (United Press) describes the fighting at Hunt’s Gap in Tunisia in February-March 1943. Compare this account of the battle to the German commander Oberst. Rudolf Lang’s account and British observer Howard Marshall’s account.
BRITISH BOMBER SCORES AGAINST 6 GERMAN TANKS Northern Tunisia Fighters Receiving Allied Air Support
BY EDWARD W. BEATTIE
ON THE NORTHERN TUNISIAN FRONT, March 1.—(UP)—There were six enemy tanks—big boys, probably Mark VI’s—massed north of the Mateur-Beja road when a bomber went in and dropped two bombs squarely into the middle of them.
British soldiers threw their helmets into the air and cheered. And well they might, for troops in this area never before had such air support as they are now receiving.
The British bombers caught Rommel’s supply columns in a narrow valley above. Beja Sunday. There was a thick fog lying across the valley and it was not an ideal day for bombing.
But, starting at dawn, the Allied bombers made eight sorties low into the valley and when they got through, the hair-pin road along which the Axis transport was concentrated was pock-marked with bomb craters.
Enemy Immobilized
I talked to the returning pilots and they said most of the enemy vehicles were stationary and some of them immobilized by the fury of the Allied attack.
The Germans threw an attack against Allied lines above Beja Sunday, using about 10 Mark IV tanks. British Churchill tanks rolled out to oppose them and knocked out three and perhaps four of the Mark IV’s. A heavier enemy attack may come, however, because a force of about 30 German tanks was seen just off the Beja road.
Allied air power was thrown against the Germans as early as Saturday, and ground troops then reoccupied two important positions.
The British early Saturday morning took Fort McGregor—named after a young American lieutenant from Brooklyn—south of Medjez-El-Bab. The American garrison of Fort McGregor was withdrawn some time ago.
British Surprise
The Germans took it Friday. Crack German tank forces and other elements penetrated through a dry river bed to the south. The British surprised them with a counterattack, killed 40 and captured 60.
The British reoccupied Tally-Ho corner after the Germans withdrew into the hills east of the Medjez-El-Bab – El-Aroussa road during the night. When darkness came Saturday, the British were mopping up a few remnants halfway along the road.
The attack toward Beja made little progress Saturday, and was heavily bombed and shelled. The Germans sent forces of roughly a battalion (1,000 men) through the hills between the Beja-Mateur and Beja-Medjez-El-Bab road, intending to cut around the latter around over Zarga. By Saturday night, the battalion had not been in contact with the British, although artillery had shelled the Germans heavily.
Germans Use Planes
The Germans have been using their planes liberally to attack Allied positions and shoot up transport behind the front. They attacked Tally-Ho corner three times without much result.
Roughly, it was estimated the Germans threw 13 battalions (13,000 men), with supporting troops of two divisions (perhaps 30,000 men) into the action on the northern front, but paradoxically, fighting was more restricted Saturday than the day before.
Of an estimated 50 German and Italian tanks involved, It was estimated that at least 15 to 20 have been knocked out.
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