When the Allied forces first encountered the Tiger II in Normandy in the summer of 1944, the panzer was briefly referred to as the “Pantiger”. The Associated Press picked up the name “Pantiger” in their article on August 19th:
Germans have thrown a huge new, heavily armored tank into action on both the Russian and northern French fronts in an effort to stem the Allied advances, but first reports denied it was a “super weapon.”
One of the new monsters weighing over 65 tons and with six inch armor plate—an inch and a half thicker than anything the enemy yet has put into action—was taken by the British on the Orne river front. The tank was a victim of a mechanical breakdown and never had fired a shot in battle.
Christened the “Pantiger” by its captors, the tank combines the best features of the Nazi Tiger and Panther tanks, which weigh 45 tons each. It is 23 feet long and over 11 feet wide, has an extra wheel on each side of its tracks and a huge, clumsy looking turret.
A new 67-ton German heavy tank—referred to variously as Pantiger and Tiger II—has been employed against the Allies this summer in France. Actually a redesigned Tiger (Pz. Kpfw. VI), it mounts the 8.8-cm Kw. K. 43 gun. On the basis of a preliminary report, the general appearance of the new tank is that of a scaled-up Pz. Kpfw. V (Panther) on the wide Tiger tracks. It conforms to normal German tank practice insofar as the design, lay-out, welding, and interlocking of the main plates are concerned. All sides are sloping. The gun is larger than the Panther gun, and longer than the ordinary Tiger gun. Armor is also thicker than that on either the Panther or the Tiger. The turret is of new design, with bent side plates. In all respects the new tank is larger than the standard Tiger.
The following U.S. intelligence report on the Japanese Type 97 medium tank Shinhoto Chi-Ha with improved 47-mm gun was published in Enemy on Luzon: An Intelligence Summary:
TYPE 97 IMPROVED MEDIUM TANK WITH 47-MM GUN
A number of modified Japanese medium tanks were encountered on Luzon. They were basically an improvement on the Type 97 Medium Tank. The tank studied was manufactured at the Tokyo Army Arsenal in 1944.
The tank was 18 feet 2 inches long, 7 feet 6 inches wide, and 7 feet high. It was equipped with a V-12, air-cooled, valve-in-head, diesel engine with Bosch fuel pumps. The transmission provided four speeds forward and one speed in reverse. Dual steering was employed, utilizing both clutch-brake and epicyclic gear steering systems. The turret had been changed from a circular type to a semi-rectangular over-hanging type that gave a long, low appearance. Racks were mounted on the turret sides for use with the Type 94 self-projecting smoke candles. Except for a portion of the turret, all armor was riveted. The track was the conventional Japanese center-guide all steel type, 13 inches in width.
The tank mounted two Type 97 (1937) 7.7-mm tank machine guns and one Type 1 (1941) 47-mm tank gun. One machine gun was mounted in the rear of the turret, the other forward in the hull. The ammunition racks hold 120 rounds of 47-mm and 2,500 rounds of 7.7-mm ammunition, the former being both APHE and HE. The Type 1, 47-mm tank gun was almost identical to the 47-mm anti-tank gun. It was 9 feet 7 inches long, allowing 15 degrees total traverse and an elevation from plus 10 to minus 10 degrees. The turret could be traversed 360 degrees.
The following intelligence report on an unusual German remote-controlled machine-gun position encountered by U.S. troops in Normandy was published in the Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 4, December 1944.
GERMAN MACHINE-GUN TRICK
A U.S. staff sergeant, who served as an observer for a mortar section in the Normandy campaign, reports an unusual German method of firing a machine gun by remote control. Although this method has not been reported by other U.S. soldiers, and although no concrete evidence as to its effectiveness can be presented, the idea is noted here for what it may be worth as a sample of the German soldier’s ingenuity.
German Machine-gun Trick. A close-up of the machine gun, with, its pulleys. Riflemen-observers whistle signals to the gunner, to indicate Allied approach via point A. The gunner zeroes knot A, which trains the muzzle on point A. The cord arrangement for firing is not shown here.
The sergeant tells of inspecting a captured German machine-gun emplacement, which had been prepared in the highly novel manner illustrated in the figure. A rope had been attached to the butt end of the gun. This rope ran through pulleys set up on each side of the rear of the gun, so that movement of the rope would aim the gun in any lateral direction. The gun then was zeroed at certain positions in the field of fire, and these positions were marked by knots in the rope. Thus the gunner could aim the gun, and, by moving the rope back and forth, spray an area with bullets from a position out of the line of fire when the gun was attacked. The gun was fired by a trigger-and-cord arrangement not shown in the original field sketches.
The German machine-gun crew consisted of a gunner and two or three riflemen who served as observers and who reported to the gunner the particular point on the which the gun should be trained.
The following U.S. intelligence reports on Japanese suicide boats were published in Enemy on Luzon: An Intelligence Summary:
NAVY SUICIDE CRASH BOATS:
Japanese suicide crash boats manned by Naval personnel were found in a tunnel on Corregidor. The boats were loaded on small carts which were mounted on rails running from the tunnel to the beach where they were to be launched.
The Navy Suicide Crash Boat was 16 feet 8 inches long and had a beam of 5 feet 8 inches. The hull was plywood construction throughout and was powered by an automotive type, 6-cylinder, in-line, gasoline engine. The explosive charge was built into the hull of the boat. This last feature was the main difference between the Army and Navy suicide boats.
The Type 98 explosive charge weighed 640 pounds and was located below the deck forward of the cockpit. The charge could be fired by three methods: 1) electrically on impact; 2) electrically by closing a switch; and 3) by use of a pull igniter.
From the disposal point of view, the boat was dangerous to anyone unfamiliar with the circuit and switch details. It would also have been simple to rig this boat as a booby trap either electrically or through the pull igniter.
The boat carried a big charge that would be effective against ships. The only defense that a ship had was, as in the case of the suicide plane, accurate gunfire.
ARMY SUICIDE CRASH BOAT:
Japanese suicide boats, to be manned by Army personnel, were recovered at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon. These craft were the principal weapon of the Japanese Gyoro (“fishing”) battalions.
The army suicide boat was made of plywood with a length of 18½ feet and a beam of 5 feet 10 inches. It was decked with a forward hatch leading to the engine and has a cockpit aft. The boat was powered with a 6-cylinder Chevrolet automotive engine, about 85 horsepower. The maximum speed of the craft was estimated at 35 knots. The fuel capacity was about 56 gallons.
The two 120 kg depth charges were mounted on racks abreast of the cockpit. The charges could be either dropped close aboard or released when the boat crashed into the ship. At least one attack of the former type was made, resulting in damage to a merchant ship during the Luzon campaign.
Although parts of the release mechanism were not available, the operation is believed to have been as follows: the charges were fitted in the racks and held by an arrangement of slings and bars. Rods fitted to extend beyond the bow would be driven back releasing the charges during a collision with another ship. However, the coxwain could place a crossbar forward to release the charges.
The following two drawings of Molotov cocktails being used against Russian tanks appeared in the article “German Close-in Tactics Against Armored Vehicles” in Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 23, April 22, 1943. The article contained translated German documents describing infantry close-combat techniques against Russian tanks on the Eastern Front.
Based on a request by the Headquarters ETOUSA, Ninth Army compiled a list of German combat vehicles destroyed by the army from the beginning of hostilities until the cessation of hostilities in the theater. The Ninth Army categorized the destroyed figures by the type of vehicle and the method of destruction (destroyed by air force action, destroyed by ground force action, or destroyed/abandoned by the enemy).
HEADQUARTERS NINTH UNITED STATES ARMY Office of the Commanding General
APO 339 4 June 1945
SUBJECT: Destruction of German Combat Vehicles by U.S. Forces
TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, APO 655, U.S. Army
1. Reference letter Headquarters European Theater of Operations, file AG 470.8 Op AFV, dated 17 April, 1945 and 1st Indorsement thereto by your headquarters dated 30 April, 1945. The information requested in paragraph 2 of 1st Indorsement is submitted herewith.
Type of Vehicle
Destroyed by Air Force Action
Destroyed by Ground Force Action
Destroyed or Abandoned by Enemy
TOTAL
Tank
1,798
4,381
2,011
8,190
SP Gun
1,020
2,987
1,600
5,607
Armd Car
1,257
1,984
1,921
5,162
Armd Personnel Carrier
2,943
4,154
3,181
10,278
Arty Pieces
—
1,948
—
1,948
Motor Transport
8,409
16,347
7,489
32,245
Prime Movers
451
253
133
837
HP Vehicles
950
1,225
1,975
4,150
Motorcycles
246
442
473
1,161
Miscellaneous
6,130
7,433
2,318
15,881
TOTALS
23,204
41,154
21,101
85,459
2. The figures above must be accepted with certain reservations. In the case of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the Corps was withdrawn from each of the combat zones in which it was engaged almost immediately after the conclusion of the tactical phase, and, therefore, a complete count is not available. Rapidity of movement, boundary chages, and an inability to determine definitely the cause of destruction of many vehicles precluded the keeping of accurate records. In the case of artillery units, a high percentage of the fire conducted by the Corps Artillery FDC was unobserved fire, and no report of the effect was received. As a consequence, figures for such units are estimates only.
3. It was particularly difficult to differentiate between “vehicles destroyed by Air Force action” and “destroyed or abandoned by the enemy”. There will also be a certain amount of duplication of figures especially by artillery components and infantry and armored components. In some cases records maintained by batteries were destroyed or lost in action. In other oases, particularly in an infantry regiment, the personnel changed completely, and there is no one now available who can recall all of a battalion’s record.
For the Commanding General
signed/ John T. Bailey Capt. A.G.D. Asst. Adjutant General
The First Army compiled a similar list of inventoried destroyed vehicles, although the list was incomplete for a variety of reasons explained in the document.
HEADQUARTERS, First US Army, APO 230
TO: Commanding General
1. This headquarters is unable to state the total number of enemy vehicles overrun by First Army Units. A partial record only of captured and destroyed enemy vehicles has been maintained since 6 June. Theieason for the lack of this information is due to: (1) the rapid advance during certain period with the subsequent assumption of responsibility for the array area by Com Z before a complete inventory could be made, and, (2) changes in army boundaries shortly after the completion of an operation which thereby removed First army units from areas in which they had participated in fighting. Examples of the above were the breakthrough at ST LO on 25 July and the subsequent advance on AVRANCHES. The Third Army became operational 1 August 1944 and assumed responsibility for an area in which First Army units had destroyed countless enemy vehicles. Another example was the fighting in the ARGENTAN - FALAISE pocket. Although the destruction of enemy equipment was gigantic the entire area came immediately under British control after the completion of fighting, and all inventory and evacuation of enemy vehicles was done by British forces. Another example was the battle of MONS. Again the destruction of enemy equipment was exceptionally high but before any accurate oheok could be made First Army units had advanced to the German border and the area around MONS had passed to oontrol of Com Z. Again at CELLES, where the 2nd German Panzer Division, short of gasoline and heavily engagad by the 2nd Armored Division, suffered complete loss through a combination of self-destruction, ground action, and air action, the actual area of combat was turned over to British units who inventoried or evacuated all destroyed and captured enemy equipment.
2. As a general statement a very high percentage of the German administrative vehicles uncovered by First Army are believed to have been destroyed by air action deep in rear areas. Included also with these vehicles destroyed in rear areas was a substantial number of combat vehicles. On the other hand, the vehicles destroyed on main battle fields were essentially done by a combination of air and ground action with the percentage destroyed by air varying with the weather conditions.
3. Tabulated below is a partial list of captured or destroyed enemy vehicles as uncovered by First Army units from 6 June 1944 to 6 May 1945. As pointed out above, this is a partial list and represents only those vehicles inventoried by First Army Ordnance units. Information is not available on which to base an approximation as to the extent of destruction caused by either ground or air units.
The following article was printed in the December 1945 issue of C.I.C. (Combat Information Center) published by the U.S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The long, violent history of this war saw the rise of many new or radically improved weapons, from the magnetic mine in the early days to the “personnel-controlled bomb” (suicide plane) of recent fame. The story of Allied countermeasures to the threat of Axis weapons is in many cases as dramatic as the weapons themselves.
German planes carried the radio-guided missiles under their wings.
For instance, take the case of the German radio-controlled bomb. As early as 1941 British Intelligence began receiving reports that the Germans were developing a bomb which could be remotely controlled from a parent aircraft. Development and operational use, however, are two different things, and it was not until August, 1943, that the Luftwaffe was ready to unveil it. A group of corvettes on anti-submarine patrol in the Bay of Biscay were attacked by what was identified as a remotely controlled bomb—a missile resembling a small fighter plane—capable of radical maneuvering both in azimuth and elevation. The parent aircraft were DO217 twin-engined bombers. One of the corvettes was sunk, another damaged. Later in August further highly successful attacks were made against shipping in the Mediterranean and Bay of Biscay. The bomb (designated HS293) was released by the parent plane at altitudes of 3000-5000 feet and ranges of three to five miles from the target. The missile was jet-assisted shortly after its release; its speed, variously estimated at the time, is now known to have been about 325 knots. The controlling operator in the plane was able to follow the bomb visually by observing a light in the tail.
During and immediately following the Salerno landings the German guided missile program moved into high gear. The enemy introduced another type of controlled missile, the FX, a radio-corrected 4400 pound bomb of tremendous power and accuracy, as anyone present in Salerno Gulf at that time will testify. The Luftwaffe caught units of the Italian Fleet racing to reach Allied ports and scored heavily with both HS293 and FX bombs. They attacked Allied shipping in Salerno Gulf, sinking and damaging several British and United States warships, large and small. It was estimated that nearly 50% of the bombs launched were hits or damaging near misses.
At that time radio control was suspected (on the basis of prisoner-of-war reports) but was by no means confirmed. The control hand was supposed to lie in the 20 Mc region, and desperate, hastily improvised jamming effort was concentrated in this band, which seemed to improve morale without affecting the accuracy of the missiles.
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