1. INTRODUCTION

The Intelligence Bulletin seeks to acquaint our junior officers and enlisted men as far as possible with the characteristics, training, and background of enemy troops. Such information has been given in each of the four preceding monthly issues of this publication. Particular reference is made at this time to the following sections which dealt with the Japanese: "Section I. GROUND FORCES," issue No. 1; "Section I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPANESE" and "Section II. GROUND FORCES" issue No. 2; "Section II. THE SOLOMON ISLANDS CAMPAIGN" issue No. 3; and "Section I. FIGHTING IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS" issue No. 4. Additional information about the Japanese follows:

2. REACTION IN BATTLE

The information in this paragraph comes from several captured Japanese diaries. It shows that the Japanese have a healthy fear of our weapons--particularly bombers--and that their morale can be shaken. However, the quotations--below--should not be interpreted as being counter to previous information describing the tenacity, fanaticism, treachery, and brutality of the Japs in battle. Apart from the morale aspect, these extracts reveal that certain weaknesses existed in the Japanese defenses at some points.

The extracts:

3. EARLY TRAINING

Physical training and conditioning play an equally important part in the development of the Japanese soldier. The Japanese have been quick to realize the advantages of mechanization and motorization, but they fully realize that in many of the areas in which their troops must operate, such equipment can be used only to a limited extent. Furthermore, they feel very strongly that in warfare the machine can never take the place of man. All their training is based on the theory that troops must be prepared to operate under any conditions without the advantages of motor- or even horse-drawn transport.

The process of conditioning and hardening the soldier begins with his earliest recruit training. Physical drill, wall-scaling, road marches (a good part of which is done at double time up hill as well as on the level), fencing, bayonet training, ju-jitsu (called "judo" by the Japanese), and swimming occupy much of the soldier's time. The strictly military training is frequently carried out under adverse weather conditions, and, even in the earliest stages, is made to simulate battle conditions as realistically as circumstances will permit.

Because training in schools and universities does much to furnish the army with recruits who are already partially conditioned and toughened, the Japanese soldier is brought to a state of physical fitness very soon after his induction into the service. He needs this early conditioning because his training during the rest of his service will include long marches and maneuvers with full pack and equipment under a hot summer sun in Formosa or other tropical areas, or long periods of tactical exercises in the cold winters of Hokkaido and "Manchoukuo," frequently followed by a night in open bivouac in the snow without fires or lights of any kind. Men who have experienced these hardships find, under the stress of battle, that they have become accustomed to physical strains and are freer to concentrate on overcoming the other difficulties which might confuse them in action.

Japanese training doctrine calls for special emphasis on field exercises, and insists on a maximum degree of realism in their execution. Whenever possible the enemy is represented by troops, not by flags or dummies; and trenches, barbed wire, and other obstacles are actually constructed in the area over which the troops are to operate. Every effort is made to simulate the noise, confusion, and befuddled vision which so frequently exist in actual battle, in order to accustom officers and men to that peculiar state known as the "fog of war." Artillery and machine-gun barrages are fired over the heads of friendly troops, and live grenades and mortars are used, although with reduced charges. So realistic was the training of the divisions which were rehearsing in the hills near Canton for the attack on Hong Kong that the troops suffered "a number of casualties." No considerations, either political or humane, are ever allowed to interfere with what the high command believe to be the one and only purpose of the training program--the production of fighting men.

All soldiers in the Japanese Army receive basic infantry training during their recruit period and take frequent refresher courses throughout their term of service. The training is progressive and thorough. Instruction proceeds systematically from the School of the Soldier to exercises involving large units and combined arms. In addition to this purely peace-time training, many officers and men were rotated through the ranks of active divisions on the China front before joining units destined to take part in the major campaigns of the present war. Service in China was considered a very important part of the training program, and every effort was made to give this experience to the largest possible number of men. The Japanese have made conscientious use of the facilities afforded for small-unit training in the comparatively quiet areas of China and for higher unit and combined staff work in the more active sectors.

In all field exercises, the Japanese soldier is required to make full use of the terrain for cover and concealment. He is taught to improvise simple camouflage by using grass, twigs, branches of trees, and even by plastering himself with mud. Each combat soldier is provided with an individual camouflage net which he uses when on scouting or sniping duty. All men in the infantry and engineers are trained in the duties of scouts or snipers and much time is devoted to instruction in infiltration methods. Normally, in combat, only selected men are used for this type of work, but all those units fighting in jungle areas have been greatly benefited by the fact that all officers and men have had some experience in maintaining themselves, and in operating for days at a time, individually or in small groups, behind the enemy's lines.

Night operations play an important part in the training of Japanese troops of all arms. An effort is made to get every combat soldier out once a week on some sort of night problem with special emphasis being laid on individual, squad, and platoon exercises. More than half of the six weeks of intensive training engaged in by the troops designated for the attack on Hong Kong was devoted to night operations. Their efforts were well repaid, for the key point in the British defense line on the Kowloon peninsula was captured after some two hours of fighting when a Japanese infantry battalion and a few engineers launched a well-timed and perfectly coordinated night attack against the position and caught the defenders completely by surprise.

Recent manuals bearing on various aspects of the training of officers stress the necessity of developing initiative in all grades, and the danger of adhering too rigidly to previously formulated plans when the situation demands a change in the course of action. That the Army has taken this to heart and can apply it in even the most complicated form of engagement was demonstrated at Kota Bharu (East coast of Malaya) where the repulse of the Japanese landings in the north and central sectors of the beach necessitated a change of plans in the midst of the engagement, involving the movement of men, barges, and even ships to the southern flank. This difficult maneuver was carried out in the face of the enemy, after the troops had suffered considerable losses, and during the hours of darkness. The Malayan campaign contains numerous other examples of rapid changes in tactics by troops whose first attempts to advance had been blocked by determined enemy resistance. Japanese troops are still taught to move forward regardless of losses when no other method presents itself, but officers are trained to seek out the soft spots in an enemy line and to make their plans flexible enough to take advantage of any change in the situation which may occur.

Mass singing is used extensively. The Japanese say that martial marching songs heighten morale and that the beat of the music aids the rhythm of breathing, thereby easing fatigue. This feature has obviously been borrowed from the Germans, whose army has for many years recognized the value of mass singing.

4. COUNSEL ON FIELD SERVICE

The information in this paragraph was taken from a Japanese manual called "Battlefield Discipline" (Senjin Kunren).

5. UNIFORMS

Extreme caution should be exercised in identifying the Japanese soldier by means of clothing and personal effects. Japanese troops in recent campaigns often have exhibited a complete lack of uniformity in dress.

In the majority of cases reported in Malaya, Japanese noncoms and privates wore uniforms of a cloth similar to our khaki drill. Officers wore slightly darker or greener khaki. The badge of rank usually was worn on the collar. A soft fatigue cap was worn underneath the steel helmet, which is much deeper than our old type and which is also distinguishable by a five-pointed star in the front center. In Burma, the Japanese were sometimes found wearing Chinese hats (peaked with a round crown). Footwear consisted of black or brown boots or tabi (canvas shoes, with heavy rubber soles, in which the big toe is separated from the remainder of the foot), with puttees up to the knee.

However, there were several deviations from the above standard attire, arising from pure necessity or from deliberate attempts at disguise.

Some of the prisoners were wearing pajamas and even Chinese civilian dress. Captured Japanese equipment often included a soft straw hat, shorts, sweat shirts, and canvas shoes, which prisoners explained as part of their evening change in tropical weather. Instances have been reported by our troops of Japanese soldiers wearing captured British gas capes, Indian uniforms, and Malayan clothes. Such variations in dress have been observed principally on the front-line troops, who are fond of discarding their own cheap apparel for British clothing, both to disguise their identity and to satisfy their instinct for loot.

From the foregoing, it will be understood that the uniform is not always a foolproof means of identifying a Japanese soldier. In addition, it is advisable to study his facial and physical characteristics, especially so as to be able to distinguish him from our ally, the Chinese. (See Section I, Characteristics of the Japanese, Intelligence Bulletin No. 2.)