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By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 23rd, 2011%
A diagram showing some typical layouts of ground-to-air signal panels from the U.S. War Department’s Handbook for Combat Air Intelligence Officers, Army Air Forces Air Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, March 1944.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 23rd, 2011%
Three views of the German 105-mm howitzer (10.5 cm leFH 18, leichte FeldHaubitze) from the U.S. War Department technical manual TM E9-325A: German 105-mm Howitzer Materiel, June 1944.
 German 105-mm Howitzer and Carriage, Firing Position Continue reading German 105-mm Howitzer
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 20th, 2011%
The commander of II Corps published the following comments concerning the combat lessons learned during the advance from the Garigliano River to Rome in Italy in 1943-1944:
HEADQUARTERS II CORPS
In the Field
16 June 1944
Subject: Lessons Learned.
To: Divisions and Separate Unit Commanders, II Corps.
1. A detailed analysis of lessons learned during the II Corps advance from the GARIGLIANO to ROME is being made. This study will be published at an early date. Rather than wait for the publication of the detailed compilation, I wish to give you my comments now so they can be acted upon during the present training period.
a. Towns must be taken from deep flank and rear.
b. The usual practice of battering towns with air and artillery serves little purpose and is extremely wasteful of ammunition and time.
c. The delay caused as by small enemy detachments is out of all proportion to the numbers and means at our disposal. Among other errors committed is our failure to leave roads soon enough and to make a wide enough envelopment or by-pass.
d. The combined use of armored and infantry units has been too cautious. The over-emphasis placed on fire power of tanks during the period when weather and terrain conditions prevented full use of armor has not been overcome and mobility has not been restored to its proper importance in the employment of tanks. Too often a column of tanks has remained inactive on a road, held up by a single SP or AT gun. The time lost waiting for infantry to arrive, deploy and attack the gun could have been reduced 50% or more by a rapid deployment and movement of the tanks or by a wide envelopment which would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun. Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a rod. Again, the time wasted waiting for the arrival and action of tanks could have been materially reduced by early and wide deployment.
e. Not enough use has been made of Air OP’s for reconnaissance purposes. Inasmuch as artillery targets have been relatively few during this pursuit phase, there should have been constant Cub air reconnaissance available to all leading elements.
f. In the long run, speed was made over the high ground, not over the roads or flat lands.
g. Too often commanders of all echelons waited for orders. The rapid advance made the maintenance of communications difficult and resulted in instructions being issued and received based on out of date information. Under such conditions commanders must act on their own responsibility, initiative and judgment. Inactivity is inexcusable.
2. We must be prepared mentally and tactically for a change in the character of combat when we next go into the line for we may encounter strong and bitter resistance. At some date or place the German may seek to make a stand but our constant pressure should greatly hamper him from getting set. The main bodies following our mobile advance detachments must be kept so in hand that they can be employed rapidly in accordance with simple and prepared plans.
3. Speed, not haste, is still the great factor.
GEOFFREY KEYES
Major General, U.S.A., Commanding.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on November 20th, 2011%
The following report on Allied signal intelligence during Operation Torch and the campaign in North Africa is reproduced from “Intelligence Lessons from North Africa, Operation Torch” by the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, March 1943.
C. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (Y).
20. Any review of the lessons learnt in this campaign in the functioning of Signals Intelligence (British: Wireless Intelligence, generally known as Y) can be divided into three parts:
a. Before landing,
b. After landing and
c. General.
It is proposed to consider the subject under these three heads.
21. Before Landing.
The outstanding lesson learnt was the need for dispatching complete units in the first follow up and not dividing them into roughly two halves between convoys 2 .and 3. This precaution had been taken to avoid the risk of the total loss of the unit, but it is now seen that by dividing the unit or units among several ships of the same convoy the same insurance against total loss is achieved. The advantages are that in the early stages of any campaign the maximum amount of Y cover is necessary as no other day to day source of intelligence exists, and also that the enemy being less security minded when his plans are interfered with, more is given away, all of which may be of exceeding value as the campaign develops. Considerable pressure would have to be exercised on the branch responsible for loading tables, but the advantages of a complete Y unit to the formation commander are such that the highest priority for its inclusion entire should be obtainable.
22. After Landing.
a. Assignment.
As 5 Corps did not land in the first follow up, the Corps Y unit (B-type Section) was attached to 78 Div H.Q. This arrangement worked extremely well, and the smallness of the Div I Staff was compensated by one of the I.O.’s of the Section estimating the value of Y intelligence in terms of I(a). Whenever the same problem arises, it is recommended that the Corps B-type Section be attached to the senior Division acting in quasi Corps role until such time as Corps H.Q. have landed. This is preferable to keeping the unit back until Corps H.Q. have landed partly for the reasons mentioned in para. 21 and partly because no Y unit can produce intelligence the moment it sets up house. This is due to the necessity for sorting the traffic heard (since all major wireless bands are full of’ traffic, much of which can be, heard even when the transmitter is many hundreds of miles away). The two mobile D/F trucks now part of every B-type Section have a considerable part to play in this preliminary sorting process.
b. B-type Section (1942).
The revised B-type Section (1942) is an undoubted improvement on the 1941 edition. This has only been partly evident so far, as the Section with 5 Corps is on the old establishment as regards personnel and transport but on the new one as regards equipment. Had the Section been completely on the new establishment it would undoubtedly have produced more; if not better, results. The strain on too few operators coping with increased sets has resulted in a certain amount of: sickness-due to overkeenness on their part.
c. Communications.
The need for adequate communications facilities between all Sections of the Y Service cannot sufficiently be stressed. Y must be provided with its own W/T communications as quite apart from the need for passing intelligence (in high grade cypher) it cannot function properly unless technical information is continually passing between all its units and I(s) at higher levels. The normal Signals channels can sometimes cope with the intelligence side, rarely with the technical information which is often required in the form of “question and answer”.
A further point is that communication should be authorized from the start with G.H.Q. of adjacent theater or theaters. Owing to special cyphers for Y intelligence issued to this H.Q. not being made available to G.H.Q. Middle East, much valuable assistance from Mideast in the early stages could not be received.
d. Siting of Units.
The siting of Y units provided many difficulties owing to the mountainous nature of the ground. Not until recently has a general move forward of higher formations taken place so that the problem has constantly been where to site units so that they fulfill their two main functions
(1) of taking the traffic required.
(2) of passing it in shortest time to the Intelligence Branch of the formation to which assigned.
The only general answer possible is that units may have to be sited near a lower formation than is customary, reporting over their own links to the higher formation to which they belong. (The alternative of a Signal Center does not work well in practice as the lines are usually overloaded no matter what priority is assigned to Y units.)
23. General.
The following points of a more general application are grouped together for convenience though not necessarily inter-related.
a. Inclusion of ‘veterans’.
An immense advantage would accrue in any future operation by the inclusion of personnel from units with battle experience on the strength of new units first coming out. Experience counts more in Y work than is generally realized. A judicious interlarding with Mideast personnel in units fresh from home would have been of great value in this operation.
b. I a Training for I.O.’s.
Y I.O.’s trained in U.K. need to be more Ia minded. A detailed Order of Battle knowledge is an invaluable asset to any I.O. and more stress on this might be laid. It is also necessary for the Y I.O. to know what is, and is not, important to Ia so that his choice of information to pass back immediately may be right. So much of the intelligence produced by Y is ‘scrappy’ (due to difficulties of reception, new or only partially broken codes and the like) that the selection of the right ‘straw’ to indicate the wind is not always apparent. It is recommended therefore: that all I.O.’s in Y should at some period — preferably after being Y trained — serve an attachment of some weeks duration at Ia of a formation, preferably Corps or Division.
c. Intelligence School.
Soon after the start of any operation such as this provision should be made at G.H.Q. for a small “Intelligence School” to read all logs from Y units in the theater, to produce wireless network diagrams from them to check callsigns serial and row changes and generally to be responsible for the longer term W/T I. Sections in the field have little opportunity for more then short term W/T I and in times of battle practically none at all. Investigation into map reference systems, code systems, and the like cannot be undertaken locally but must be done centrally. This is a very real need and should be catered for in any future operation. This party should normally arrive simultaneously with the Army A-type Section.
d. Pool of Reinforcements.
An adequate pool of reinforcements should be drawn up and included in all future operations. In this theater only two W/T I Other Ranks were provided and were absorbed soon after landing leaving no reinforcements whatsoever. On the Signals side the scale is also too low and requires reconsideration. Any loss of personnel through enemy action or sickness is immediately reflected in the operational output of the unit. The ideal solution would be the dispatch of one complete B-type Section over and above those assigned to Corps. This unit could then relieve Corps Sections in rotation either in whole or in part and provide all grades of reinforcements as required.
e. American Y Units.
All the above remarks have been confined to British units as the participation of complete American units in this theater has not yet materialized. The American Section with British W/T I personnel has acquitted itself well in spite of many handicaps due to faults inherent in the general organization of American field Y units. This subject is one however which needs to be investigated at a higher level and a joint American-British Committee might well at some later stage be charged with examining the problem in the light of British experience and American difficulties.
24. Conclusion.
In the main the plans made, the training of the units and the results achieved have been entirely satisfactory. The improvements suggested above are chiefly concerned with detail and should without undue difficulty be capable of realization.
25. I.S. Staff at Army H.Q.
It is considered that only one I(s) Staff Officer is needed at Army H.Q. until the arrival of the A-type Section.
26. Water Trailer for A-type Special Wireless Section.
A-type Special Wireless Section has a strength of 54 all ranks and only sixteen 2-gallon containers to hold drinking water. For technical reasons, the section is often sited in remote areas where the problem of obtaining drinking water is great.
It is considered that a water trailer is essential for the section.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on June 6th, 2011%
Introduction to the “bazooka” (2.36-inch AT Rocket Launcher M1A1) from the technical manual TM 9-294: 2.36-inch A.T. Rocket Launcher M1A1, War Department Technical Manual, September, 1943.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. SCOPE.
a. This manual is published for the information and guidance of personnel charged with the operation and maintenance of the 2.36-inch AT Rocket Launcher M1A1. It contains information required by the using arms to identify, use, care, and preserve the materiel and the ammunition used therewith. In addition, it contains information required by ordnance personnel for the maintenance and repair of the materiel.
2. CHARACTERISTICS (figs. 1 and 2).
a. The 2.36-inch AT Rocket Launcher M1A1 is an electrically operated weapon of the open tube type. It is fired from the shoulder in the standing, kneeling, sitting, or prone positions. It is used to launch high-explosive rockets against tanks, armored vehicles, pill boxes, and emplacements. The rockets weigh approximately 3½ pounds and are capable of penetrating heavy armor at angles of impact up to 30 degrees. The weapon can be aimed up to distances of 300 yards. Greater ranges may be obtained by estimating the angle of elevation. The maximum range is 700 yards.
 Figure 1 -- 2.36-Inch AT Rocket Launcher M1A1 -- Left Side View  Figure 2 -- 2.36-Inch AT Rocket Launcher M1A1 -- Right Side View Continue reading Introduction to the Bazooka
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on May 11th, 2011%
“Targets of the Eighth Air Force” from a special edition of Army Talks, “Stars over the Reich,” published for the officers and men of the Eighth Air Force.
Targets of the Eighth
A. Aircraft Industry (includes assembly, engine and repair plants and airfields). The four great air blows in February 1944 were a decisive factor in weakening the Luftwaffe and giving the Allies the essential air superiority before the invasion of Europe. They were the first of many aimed at aircraft.
B. Tactical Direct Army Support (includes coastal and military defenses, bridges and all marshalling yards attacked after 1 June ’44). Although designed for strategic bombing, the Eighth proved its flexibility during the invasion days in the tactical support it gave to the ground and sea forces by crippling German ground force support.
C. Oil Industry (includes refineries, synthetic oil, and storage). The Germans have more planes, tanks, vehicles and other equipment than they are able to operate, owing to the critical shortage of fuel and lubricants. Strategic bombing has played a very large part in causing this shortage.
D. Flying Bomb Sites. The Eighth, though not designed for such work, took part in the pounding of these targets when the flying bomb menace became serious.
E. U-Boat Industry (includes sub-pens, bases and construction yards). At the height of the German submarine activity in the winter of 1942-43 the Forts and Libs gained experience at the expense of the U-boats and had a big hand in whittling down the U-boat supremacy.
F. Indirect Army Support (includes tank, vehicle and locomotive plants, steel industry, ordnance depots, and marshalling yards prior to 1 June ’44). This is one of the basic strategic jobs of the Eighth Air Force.
G. Ball Bearing Industry. A small but significant target, since the serious damage caused by bombing has been a production bottleneck for the aircraft and other industries dependent on the manufacture of ball bearings.
H. Rubber Industry. The same is true of this target, especially for transportation.
I. Miscellaneous Strategic. An assortment of targets have been attacked in key industrial areas when weather has singled them out as targets of opportunity or as suitable for overcast bombing.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on April 5th, 2011%
Organization of the WWII Japanese Army Air Service and Naval Air Service from the U.S. War Department’s Handbook for Combat Air Intelligence Officers, Army Air Forces Air Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, March 1944.
3. ORGANIZATION.
a. General.
(1) Owing to the excellence of Japanese counterintelligence during the years in which they were building their air strength, and owing to the difficulty of the Japanese language, Allied information about the organization of the Japanese Air Services is scanty and possibly inaccurate. (Charts C and D give the latest information available about the organization of both the Army and Naval Air Services.)
Continue reading Organization of the Japanese Air Force
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on March 3rd, 2011%
Battleship USS Missouri from All Hands, Bureau of Naval Personnel Information Bulletin, October 1945.
‘THE PEOPLE OF MISSOURI CAN TAKE PRIDE…’
On 29 Jan 1944, the Senator from Missouri, Harry Truman, spoke at the launching of the nation’s mightiest battlewagon, the USS Missouri. He said: “The time is surely coming when the people of Missouri can thrill with pride as the Missouri and her sister ships sail into Tokyo Bay.”
 MISSOURI, flanked by destroyer, steams into Tokyo Bay. Astern is the Iowa. Eighteen months later, the Senator had become President and the Missouri was destined to play an even more dramatic role than had been anticipated either during her launching or during the months of bitter fighting when she helped devastate the Jap war machine. For it was the Missouri that was selected for the formal surrender signing.
The $100,000,000-dreadnaught is an apt symbol of the great role played by the Navy in the defeat of Japan. The equivalent of an 18-story building in height—with seven of these stories under water—the Missouri helped batter Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the Tokyo area.
The Missouri, like other American capital ships, suffered from a Kamikaze hit. On 11 April a Jap suicide plane crashed into her superstructure and then hit her starboard side aft. The resulting fire was quickly extinguished and the Missouri did not even alter her course.
By the middle of July, when the Navy prepared for what was to be the final blow at Japan, Admiral Halsey chose the Missouri as flagship of the Third Fleet.
The 45,000-ton man o’ war—she is the same class as the Iowa, New Jersey and Wisconsin—is the fourth warship of her name. The first was a side-wheeled frigate completed in 1842. She was destroyed by fire while anchored in Gibraltar in 1844. The second Missouri was a Confederate iron-clad steam ram.
The third of that name, a 12,500-ton battleship, put to sea about 40 years ago and aboard was a young midshipman named Bill Halsey, today the Admiral in command of the Third Fleet. She was scrapped in 1922 under the Washington Treaty.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on January 20th, 2011%
Analysis of captured German and Italian equipment, particularly newly encountered panzers such as the Tiger tank in Tunisia, remained a priority for Allied intelligence and ordnance teams throughout WWII. The following brief summary of these efforts is taken from “Intelligence Lessons from North Africa, Operation Torch” by the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, March 1943.
Captured Material
The problem of getting back captured material is a difficult one as fighting units do not have the technical ability to decide what should be sent back and are usually too busy to make the necessary arrangements. In Tunisia, the situation is further complicated as most captured equipment is at once handed over to the French to make up shortages.
The War Department is shortly sending out a team of ordnance personnel trained in the examination of enemy material, to work under the Intelligence Branch at Allied Force Headquarters. It is proposed to have a portion of this team well forward, to be sent to any part of the line where active operations are taking place. They will be responsible for discovering what material has been captured and for ensuring that it is evacuated to the rear as early as possible. The remainder of the team will be at Allied Force Headquarters under the Technical Intelligence officer to arrange for photographs, measurements and dispatch to U.K. or U.S.
It is recommended that similar teams be organized in future for British expeditions with transport including at least one 30 cwt. truck for the removal of material.
By Lone_Sentry_Admin, on January 15th, 2011%
Instructions for storage and shipment of the Dodge weapons carrier and variants (WC-51 through WC-60) from TM 9-808: ¾-Ton 4×4 Truck (Dodge), War Department Technical Manual, January 1944.
STORAGE AND SHIPMENT
194. STORAGE AND SHIPMENT (GENERAL).
a. The 3/4-ton truck will usually be shipped uncrated for domestic shipment. For overseas shipment trucks will usually be shipped crated in pairs. Preparation for temporary storage (less than 60 days) will be the same as preparation for domestic shipment, and preparation for indefinite storage (over 60 days) will be the same as the preparation for overseas shipment.
b. Preparation for Domestic Shipment and Temporary Storage.
(1) LUBRICATION. Lubricate the vehicle completely before storage or shipment.
(2) FUEL IN TANKS. It will not be necessary to remove the fuel from the tanks nor to label these tanks under Interstate Commerce Commission Regulations.
(3) WATER IN RADIATOR. Drain the radiator only when there is a possibility of freezing during storage or shipment. If the water is drained from the radiator, tie a conspicuous tag to the steering wheel of each vehicle indicating that the radiator is empty.
(4) BATTERY. Disconnect the battery by removing the positive battery cable. Tape the cable and tie it away from the battery.
(5) UNPAINTED SURFACES. Treat all unpainted and exposed surfaces with rust-preventive before the vehicle is stored or shipped. After cleaning the surface with solvents or a soap, solution, treat all exterior surfaces with a thin film of rust-preventive compound. Apply preventive cold by spraying or brushing. It will harden to a tough thin film. Treat surfaces from which it would be difficult to remove rust-preventives, such as the bore of a gun, with rust-preventive compound, light. Apply this compound by brushing or slushing.
(6) TIRES. For domestic shipment, inflate the tires to about 10 pounds above normal.
(7) INSPECTION. Make systematic inspection just before shipment or storage. Make a list of all missing items or broken items that are not repaired, and attach the list to the steering wheel.
c. Preparation for Overseas Shipment and Indefinite Storage.
Observe all precautions given in paragraph 194b in preparation for overseas shipment and indefinite storage. Many additional precautions must be taken, especially for overseas shipment. (See AR 850-18.)
195. SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR STORAGE.
a. Take the following precautions when the truck is prepared for storage.
b. Engine.
(1) Check the engine oil and replenish if necessary.
(2) Remove the air cleaner from the carburetor.
(3) Start the engine and run it at a fast idle, spraying approximately one pint of lubricating oil preservative (medium) into the carburetor throat. Turn off the ignition switch immediately after the oil has been sprayed into the carburetor.
(4) With the ignition switch off, open the throttle wide and turn the engine over several complete revolutions by means of the starting motor.
(5) Install the air cleaner.
c. Brakes. Release the brakes and block the wheels.
d. Inspections.
(1) Inspect the vehicles weekly for tire leaks or discharged batteries.
(2) Upon removal from storage, repair or replace any items noted on the tag attached to the steering wheel as still needing repair or still missing, and perform a complete monthly maintenance inspection.
196. METHODS OF SECURING VEHICLE ON FREIGHT CARS.
a. There are two approved methods of blocking the 3/4-ton trucks on freight cars as described below.
b. Method 1 (fig. 209).
(1) BLOCKS B. Place eight blocks B to the front and to the rear of each front wheel and to the front of each forward rear wheel, and to the back of each rearward rear wheel. Nail the heel of the block to the car floor with five 40-penny nails, and toenail that portion of the block under the tire to the car floor with two 40-penny nails. CAUTION: Nail blocks B in such a position that cleats C will clear face of tires by 1/2 inch.
 Figure 209. Method 1 for Blocking ¾-Ton 4x4 Truck (Dodge) on Freight Cars (2) CLEATS C. Place two cleats C against the outside face of blocks B at each front and rear wheel. Nail the lower cleats to the car floor with three 40-penny nails and the top cleat to the cleats below with three 40-penny nails. Fill the 1/2-inch space between tires and cleats C with burlap or other similar material to prevent chafing of tires.
(3) STRAPPING D. Pass four strands, two wrappings, of No. 8 gage, black annealed wire (D, fig. 209) through the spokes of the wheels and the stake pockets. Tighten the wires enough to remove slack. If a box car is used, apply this strapping in similar fashion and attach it to the floor by the use of blocking or anchor plates. This strapping is not required when gondola cars are used.
c. Method 2 (fig. 210).
(1) BLOCKS F. Place one block F across the front and one across the rear of the front wheels. Place one block F to the front of the forward rear wheels and one block F to the rear of the rearward rear wheels. These blocks must be at least eight inches wider than the over-all width of the vehicle at the car floor.
 Figure 210. Method 2 for Blocking ¾-Ton 4x4 Truck (Dodge) on Freight Cars (2) CLEATS E. Place sixteen cleats E against blocks F, as shown in figure 210.
(3) CLEATS C. Wrap cleats C with burlap or other similar material to prevent chafing of tires. Place one cleat C against the outside of each front wheel on the top of block F, as shown in figure 210. Nail the cleats to each block F with two 40-penny nails.
(4) STRAPPING D. Pass four strands, two wrappings, of No. 8 gage, black annealed wire (D, fig. 210) through the spokes of the wheels and the stake pockets. Tighten the wires enough to remove slack. If a box car is used, apply this strapping in similar fashion and attach it to the floor by the use of blocking or anchor plates. This strapping is not required when gondola cars are used.
197. OVERSEAS SHIPMENT.
a. The truck will usually be crated for overseas shipment to protect the truck, to reduce cubic measurement, and to facilitate stowage. Usually this crate will be made up as a twin pack; that is, containing two vehicles broken down as much as necessary in order to save cubic displacement. When such crating is necessary, it should be performed in accordance with IOSSC-(a), “Introduction to Ordnance Storage and Shipment Chart, Section (a), Instructions and Specifications for Packaging Ordnance General Supplies.”
198. SHIPMENT WITH COMBAT UNITS.
a. Shipping of Vehicles, Combat Loaded.
(1) Do not disassemble the vehicle. Protect unpainted surfaces with lubricating oil preservative.
(2) BLOCKING. Whenever possible, use blocking similar to that shown in figures 212 and 213. However, special precautions must be taken to prevent the materiel from moving sideways.
b. Protection During Shipping.
(1) MATERIALS AVAILABLE. Keep a supply of the required cleaning and preserving materials available for servicing while in transit.
(2) DECK LOADS. When the materiel is shipped on deck, cover the vehicle with a closely fitting tarpaulin. Seal all engine openings, such as the carburetor, air intake, exhaust outlet, oil breather outlet, etc., with waterproof tape. Apply this sealing so that it is easily accessible without disassembly in order that the vehicle may be ready for immediate action.
c. Inspections. Make daily inspections for signs of corrosion which should be checked immediately by reapplication of rust-preventives and lubricating oil. Do not allow salt water to dry on unprotected surfaces under any circumstances. If possible, after the materiel has been subjected to salt water flush the materiel with clean, fresh water.
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